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UNPACKING THE IDEA OF THE JUDICIAL
CENTER
G. EDWARD WHITE*
This Article describes the principal ways in which the idea of the
judicial center has been articulated in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, emphasizing connections between shifting formulations
of the idea and the jurisprudential perspectives driving commentary
on the Supreme Court by political scientists, journalists, and legal
scholars. It then seeks to explain, in light of that description, why
the idea of the judicial center is currently perceived by many
commentators as an important point of departure for their
observations on the dynamics of the Rehnquist Court. It concludes
with some observations about how one might sharpen an
understanding of the idea of the judicial center through further
scholarly investigations.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, New York Times correspondent Linda Greenhouse
wrote an article whose first sentence identified "[t]he birth struggle of
a new era" on the Supreme Court.' Greenhouse suggested that
"[1long-held assumptions about the authority of the national
government, the relationship between Washington and the states, and
the ability of the Federal Government to take race into account in
making public policy, were all placed on the table for dissection."2
She claimed that, "[a]n ascendant bloc of three conservative Justices
with an appetite for fundamental, even radical change, [had driven]
the Court on a re-examination of basic Constitutional principles" in
the 1994 Term.3
Greenhouse's article was entitled "Farewell to the Old Order in





the Court," and its headline stated, "The Right Goes Activist." The
article, however, was not just about the "unstable [and] riveting"
actions of a "conservative bloc" on the Court.4 It was also about the
fact that, according to Greenhouse, "[t]he center all but disappeared
from the Court this term."5 Two Justices nominated by President Bill
Clinton, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, were "widely
expected to help anchor a strong central bloc."6 But "there turned
out to be virtually no center for these two experienced Federal judges
to anchor [as they] joined a Court that, far from converging toward
the center, was driven by competing visions of the Constitution and
the country."7 As the "center" of the Court vanished, Greenhouse
suggested, Ginsburg and Breyer found themselves "on one side [of a]
divide" on constitutional issues, along with Justices John Paul Stevens
and David Souter.8 The other side included the "ascendant bloc,"
composed of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices Antonin
Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, plus "conservative" Justices Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor, on whom the ascendant bloc of
Justices "could usually count ... in nearly all the term's most
important contested cases."9 The "center" of the Court was "a void,"
Greenhouse announced."
In applying the terms "center" and "central bloc" to Supreme
Court Justices, Greenhouse was drawing on several decades of
scholarship in which those terms had come to be used as
encapsulations of the postures of Justices. The use of the terms had
evolved over those decades, and by the time Greenhouse employed
them, the terms could have been understood as having any of three
possible meanings.
One meaning of "center" was spatial. The term located the
position of a Justice on a Court based on the voting pattern of that
Justice in a sample of cases. The sample typically involved cases
raising constitutional issues, or other issues with discernible policy
implications, that resulted in nonunanimous decisions. The location
of a Justice-in a "left," "right," or "center" position on the Court-
was determined by attaching ideological labels to outcomes in the
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Such tabulations resulted in the identification of some Justices at the
"center" of a Court because their votes in the sampled cases tended
to alternate, in a roughly equal fashion, between "left" (or "liberal")
and "right" (or "conservative") outcomes.11
Greenhouse's article used, "as a rough measure of the Court's
ideological polarities," the opposing positions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens in nonunanimous cases.12 Rehnquist
and Stevens were on opposite sides in thirty-five such cases, and
Greenhouse took it as self-evident that Rehnquist's voting position, in
all the cases, could be characterized as right of center, and Stevens's
as left of center. 3 She then examined the alignment of other Justices
with Rehnquist or with Stevens. This produced findings, for the 1994
Term, in which some Justices, such as Breyer, who voted sixteen
times with Rehnquist and eighteen times with Stevens, or Souter, who
voted fourteen times with Rehnquist and twenty times with Stevens,
appeared closer to the "center" of the Court than other Justices, such
as Thomas, who voted thirty-three times with Rehnquist, and
Ginsburg, who voted twenty-three times with Stevens.14
The spatial meaning of the idea of a "center" on the Court was
drawn from the technique of voting alignment analysis, which was
originally introduced into commentary on the Court by behavioralist
political scientists."5 It will be important to distinguish this meaning
of judicial center from a second meaning of the concept that
Greenhouse used in her article. That meaning was captured in her
statement that Ginsburg and Breyer were "widely expected to help
anchor a strong central bloc" of Justices because they were
"pragmatic moderates" who, after being nominated by President
Clinton, "easily won confirmation with strong bipartisan support.
1 6
Used in this way, a posture at the "center" of the Court was equated
with the political stances of pragmatism and moderation. The chief
11. See infra Part L.A-B (discussing the use and application of the spatial meaning of
the term "center" by C. Herman Pritchett and others).
12. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at E4.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., David Fellman, Constitutional Law in 1953-1954, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
63, 65-66 (1955) (using voting alignment analysis in review of the Court's decisions in the
1953 and 1954 Terms); Clyde E. Jacobs, The Warren Court-After Three Terms, 9 WEST
POL. Q. 937, 938-46 (1956) (using voting alignment analysis to illustrate the impact of
Justice Earl Warren's appointment to the Court); C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of
Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCl. REV.
890, 890-96 (1941) (using voting alignment analysis in nonunanimous cases with
discernible public policy implications).
16. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at E4.
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function of pragmatist or moderate stances by Justices on the
Rehnquist Court in the mid-1990s, Greenhouse implied, was to serve
as a brake against efforts by other Justices to institute "fundamental,
even radical change" in constitutional interpretation. 7 This idea of
the judicial center was also locational, but in a different sense from
the spatial meaning. It denoted a place on the ideological spectrum in
which constitutional law and contemporary politics are said to
interact. It referred to Justices whose ideology was situated between
the "extremes" of right and left on that spectrum.
It is already apparent that what I will be calling the spatial and
political meanings of "center" may be difficult to distinguish. But the
literature in which those meanings emerged-commentary on the
Court by political scientists-drew two different inferences from the
characterization of Justices as occupying the spatial center of a Court
or being political moderates. Justices whose voting patterns revealed
them to be at the center of the Court for a given Term were just that:
during one year their votes alternated between "left" and "right"
policy outcomes in a roughly equal fashion. They might not be "at
the center" of the Court in some other Term, and their spatial
location said nothing about the political or jurisprudential bases for it.
The methodology that characterized Justices as being at the spatial
center of a Court was designed to be a positive exercise in behavioral
science.
In contrast, describing Justices as being in the "center" of the
Court because they occupied "moderate" positions on an ideological
spectrum with "extremes" was a more ambiguous term in the political
science literature commenting on the Court. Sometimes it seemed to
mean that a Justice self-consciously steered a pragmatic course
between ultraleft and ultraright policy outcomes.'8 And sometimes it
seemed to mean that a Justice was temperamentally disposed to take
a cautious approach, or to split the difference between competing
ideological stances. 9 The effort by commentators to distinguish
between these two senses of judicial center was to have significant
implications for the intelligibility of the concept.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, The Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court, 1941-
42, 4 J. POL. 491, 495 (1942) [hereinafter Pritchett, Voting Behavior] (describing a
"central" group of Justices located between a "fairly definitive left-wing" and a "less
definitive right-wing").
19. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 241 (1948) [hereinafter PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT
COURT] (discussing approaches of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts).
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Greenhouse's article also revealed that by the 1990s, a third
meaning of "judicial center" had surfaced. She claimed that if the
label "liberal" applied to Justices "who sought to use the Court as an
engine of social change," the "bloc" of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Stevens, and Souter might be called "conservatives."2  This was
because Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter were the ones
"argu[ing] on behalf of that onetime conservative shibboleth, judicial
restraint," by supporting "adherence to precedent" and by resisting
judicial "reaching out to decide cases that [were], arguably, not
properly before the Court."21
Greenhouse's comments implied that Justices who resisted
sweeping rightward changes in constitutional jurisprudence, on a
Court that potentially tilted right, could be seen as occupying the
judicial center because they were jurisprudential conservatives.22
That usage of "center" was predicated on a distinction between
political and jurisprudential conservatism: Greenhouse assumed that
the Justices on the Rehnquist Court who were inclined to favor
dramatic doctrinal changes were situated on the right end of the
political spectrum, whereas those she described as jurisprudential
conservatives were not.23 Subsequent commentators have not been
particularly enamored with the term "conservative" to describe
Justices who resist sweeping changes in constitutional law on
jurisprudential grounds. Their preferred label has been "centrist."24
Thus, the terms "center" and "centrist" are now often used to denote
Justices who resist sweeping changes in constitutional law, ostensibly
on jurisprudential grounds, in the face of pressure from a bloc of
right-leaning Rehnquist Court Justices poised to attempt a broad
reexamination of constitutional principles.25
Greenhouse's multiple formulations of the judicial center not
only serve to introduce the different ways that idea has been
represented in commentary, they can also be seen as summoning up a
distinct portrait of the current Rehnquist Court. According to that
portrait, the Rehnquist Court has no "judicial liberals," Justices who
are "activists" with progressive social agendas. Its activists are
members of the ideological right who have an interest in reexamining
established constitutional doctrines, such as those affecting the




24. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 397-401 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part V.B.
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relationship between the federal government and the states, or those
defining the ability of governmental institutions to take race, gender,
or sexual preference into account in making public policy.
Confronted with this pressure from right-wing activists on the
Court, the portrait suggests, other Justices have assumed two sorts of
"centrist" postures. Some Justices have alternated between support
for, and opposition to, rightward outcomes in constitutional cases,
staking out a "center" location on the Court. Breyer's and Souter's
voting alignments in the 1994 Term, Greenhouse suggested, put them
in that location; O'Connor's and Ginsburg's voting alignments did
not.26 On the other hand, O'Connor and Ginsburg could be called
"centrists" because they appear to be disinclined to embrace
sweeping reexaminations of constitutional doctrine. Thus, in the
portrait both sets of centrists may be seen, possibly for different
reasons, as inclined to oppose sweeping, right-leaning changes in
constitutional jurisprudence. The "center" of the Rehnquist Court is
being defined in opposition to its activist right.
When a term has multiple meanings and combines normative
and descriptive components, questions arise as to whether it can
function as a useful analytical label, or whether it instead invites
confusion or even approaches unintelligibility. One might well
conclude that the idea of the judicial center, with its different spatial,
political, and jurisprudential connotations, has little chance of
bringing clarity to the commentary on the Supreme Court. But the
increased use of the terms "center" and "centrist" by commentators,
and the prominent role of those terms in the portrait of the Rehnquist
Court just described, suggests that the idea has some resonance.
Moreover, the multiple ways in which the idea has been formulated
suggests that it needs to be unpacked.
One way to distill the import of a resonant idea in constitutional
commentary is to consider the ways in which the idea has been
formulated over time. In the case of the idea of the judicial center,
such an analysis results in two findings that serve to buttress the
importance of the idea in late twentieth and twenty-first century
constitutional commentary. One finding is that shifting formulations
of the terms "center" and "centrist" can be matched up with shifting
conceptions of the idea of the judicial center itself: the dominant
understanding of that idea has significantly changed between the
1940s and the present. The other finding is that dominant
understandings of the idea of a judicial center have tracked the
26. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at E4.
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criteria commentators on the Supreme Court have emphasized in
evaluating the performance of twentieth and twenty-first century
Supreme Court Justices. Those criteria have also changed over time.
Historicizing the idea of the judicial center thus provides an
opportunity to track shifts in the starting jurisprudential premises that
have informed commentary on the Court from World War II until the
present.
27
This Article describes the principal ways in which the idea of the
judicial center has been articulated in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, emphasizing connections between shifting formulations of
the idea and the jurisprudential perspectives driving commentary on
the Supreme Court by political scientists, journalists, and legal
scholars. It then seeks to explain, in light of that description, why the
idea of the judicial center is currently perceived by many
commentators as an important point of departure for their
27. The methodology I am employing in this Article, which emphasizes the
"unpacking" and "historicizing" of terms and concepts in American constitutional
jurisprudence and commentary, is one I have used in several other recent works; see for
example, G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 305-10 (2000)
[hereinafter WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL]; G. Edward White,
Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); G. Edward White,
The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 519-22 (2002)
[hereinafter White, The Arrival of History]; G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey
of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1529-31 (2003). My approach, which is
intended to blend historical analysis with observations on contemporary constitutional
jurisprudence, makes two assumptions.
One assumption is that evocative labels and concepts in American constitutional
jurisprudence, such as judicial "liberalism," "conservativism," "centrism," "strict" or
"rational basis" scrutiny, or even "judicial review," have universal and contextual
dimensions that need to be unraveled before they can be meaningfully employed.
"Unpacking" refers to the process of using the techniques of intellectual history, and
political and social theory, to unravel the changing meaning of those labels and concepts.
The other assumption, captured in the term "historicizing," is that such labels and
concepts have dominant meanings in particular periods of time which are replaced by
subsequent dominant meanings. When a concept or label, such as "liberalism" or "strict
scrutiny," has a dominant meaning for judges or commentators, they are inclined to
universalize its meaning, believing that it can serve as a useful way of approaching judicial
decisions made in a previous time period. That belief is almost inevitably misguided. To
take just one example, tiers of scrutiny developed in the twentieth century are of no
analytical value in explaining the constitutional decisions of the Marshall Court, because
no practice of varying the level of constitutional scrutiny with the subject matter of a
particular case existed in early nineteenth century constitutional jurisprudence.
"Historicizing" refers to the process of using techniques of intellectual history to
demonstrate the precise contextual meaning of evocative labels and concepts in given
historical periods.
The cumulative effect of the methodology is to show that the most evocative terms
of constitutional discourse are inherently ambiguous and contingent, but that close
analysis of their use over time can serve to enhance their descriptive and analytical value.
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observations on the dynamics of the Rehnquist Court. It concludes
with some observations about how one might sharpen an
understanding of the idea of the' judicial center through further
scholarly investigations.28
I. JUDICIAL BEHAVIORALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE CENTER IN
THE 1940s
This Section examines the idea of the judicial center in a
historical period in which that concept primarily signaled the spatial
location on the Court of Justices whose voting patterns alternated
between support for "left" and "right" outcomes in nonunanimous
cases with discernible public policy implications. The purpose of this
Section is to illustrate how this version of the idea, which surfaced
mainly in political science literature, was connected to the emergence
of behavioralist theories of judicial decisionmaking.
A. Behavioralism and Voting Alignments on the Supreme Court
In the 1940s, political scientists began to employ the term
"center" in their studies of the work of Supreme Court Justices. The
term had a specialized meaning: it was used to characterize a Justice's
voting pattern in certain nonunanimous cases deemed to have
significant policy implications. When a Justice was said to occupy
"the center" of the Court, or to be a "central" Justice, the designation
meant that when the Court divided on cases raising policy issues, he
tended to vote with Justices supporting "left" policy outcomes about
as much as he voted with Justices supporting "right" policy outcomes.
That definition of judicial center was associated with a particular
methodology for deriving the political perspectives of Supreme Court
Justices: voting alignment analysis.
Voting alignment analysis, as applied to Supreme Court Justices,
was a technique premised on a behavioralist theory of judicial
decisionmaking. That theory was endorsed by many commentators
on the Court from the 1940s through the 1960s.29  Advocates of
28. This Article's primary focus is on commentary by political scientists, journalists,
and legal scholars on the Supreme Court. Although it makes reference to broader
theories of judging, such as judicial behavioralism, and of the judicial function, such as
process jurisprudence, it gives principal attention to commentators' application of those
theories to the Court's decisionmaking in visible constitutional cases. Because the Article
only surveys a particular subset of twentieth and twenty-first century constitutional
commentary, its general arguments should be understood as limited by that frame of
reference.
29. See infra Part II.D.
2005] 1097
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
judicial behavioralism assumed that judges were like other public
officials holding power: they made their decisions on the basis of
ideology and politics, and the legal justifications they offered for
those decisions were in the service of the outcomes they preferred.
Judicial behavioralists believed that a once-dominant jurisprudential
proposition that judges merely "followed" the dictates of some
essentialist entity called "law" in making decisions had revealed itself
to be incoherent. The open-ended nature of authoritative legal
sources such as the Constitution or the common law, the
corresponding interpretive freedom accorded judges, and the fact that
many judicial decisions involved contested issues of public policy
meant that the calculus of judges in making decisions was similar to
that of legislators.3"
The assumptions of judicial behavioralism reflected themselves
in two lines of post-World War II commentary on the constitutional
law decisions of Supreme Court Justices. One of those lines, which
will be subsequently considered, assumed that judges themselves had
come to accept some of the ideas associated with judicial
behavioralism, especially the idea that they had the potential to have
a significant impact on public policy in their role as constitutional
interpreters.3 Some judges relished that feature of their work,
whereas others worried about the implications of policymaking by
unelected, politically unaccountable officials in a democracy.32
Accordingly, some "activist" Supreme Court Justices aggressively
scrutinized legislation on constitutional grounds if they thought its
effects unjust, while others, advocates of judicial "restraint," deferred,
on grounds of democratic theory, even to legislators whose policies
they deplored.
3
The other line of commentary, primarily by political scientists
such as C. Herman Pritchett, treated judicial decisionmaking, at least
in cases with strong policy implications, as an exercise virtually
30. In legal scholarship, the emergence of judicial behavioralism has typically been
linked with the Realist movement in jurisprudence that surfaced in American law schools
in the 1920s and had become orthodox by the 1940s. Parallels between the work of Realist
legal scholars and behavioralist-inspired literature in other disciplines in the early
twentieth century are the subject of EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY passim (1973). For examples of the effects of judicial
behavioralism on early twentieth century commentary, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 114-35 (1995) and WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE NEW DEAL, supra note 27, at 171-97.
31. See infra notes 159-74 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 445 and accompanying text.
33. See infra, text accompanying notes 119-20.
1098 [Vol. 83
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identical to that engaged in by legislators. Once judges were taken to
be political actors, and legal doctrine characterized as indeterminate
and open-ended, scholars whose expertise lay in the study of politics
began to expand their inquiries to include the performance of
Supreme Court Justices, particularly in constitutional cases. In this
version of judicial behavioralism, the significance of constitutional
cases was assumed to lie in their outcomes, and consequences for
public policy, rather than in the niceties of constitutional doctrine.
The outcomes in constitutional cases could be described in ideological
terms, the voting records of Justices in those cases compiled, and a
judge's performance characterized in the ordinary labels of politics.
The work of Pritchett in the 1940s and 1950s furnishes an
example of this line of behavioralist political science scholarship.34 A
1942 article in the Journal of Politics provides an illustration of
Pritchett's methodology, which he would employ in studies of the
34. Pritchett's work has been singled out for detailed examination for two reasons.
First, he pioneered the technique of determining the ideological perspectives of Supreme
Court Justices from the alignment of their votes in nonunanimous cases with discernible
public policy implications. His initial use of the technique appeared in Divisions of
Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941. See Pritchett, supra note
15. Pritchett's version of voting alignment analysis was extremely influential: in 1948 a
commentator wrote that "[s]ince Pritchett began his work ... he has had a host of
imitators and followers .... The result is that almost everyone working in the field of
Supreme Court study has become a sort of one-scholar census taker." John P. Frank,
Book Review, 34 IOWA L. REV. 143, 144 (1948) (reviewing C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT (1948)). For additional examples of political science scholars
employing variations of Pritchett's methodology in the 1950s, see Fellman, supra note 15
and Jacobs, supra note 15, at 938-46.
Pritchett's work also implicitly encouraged judicial behavioralists in the political
science community to employ more sophisticated and detailed quantitative research
techniques. For examples, see generally Fellman, supra note 15; Jacobs, supra note 15;
and Glendon Schubert, Behavioral Research in Public Law, 57 AM. POL. SC. REV. 433,
442-43 (1963). The efforts of this line of behavioralist quantifiers caused legal scholars in
the 1960s to take note of political science literature on judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Social Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551,
1551-1628 (1966). They also spawned critical reactions from both political scientists and
legal academics. Two prominent examples were THEODORE L. BECKER, POLITICAL
BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 7-39 (1964) and Lon L. Fuller, An
Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1604-28 (1966).
Second, Pritchett was prepared to modify his methodology when he found that it
was ceasing to have much descriptive or analytical purchase on the work of the Court. He
was far more responsive to commentary on the Court from scholars who did not share his
perspective than many subsequent judicial behavioralists in the political science
community. See, e.g., infra notes 56, 127-31, 167-69 and accompanying text. Thus,
Pritchett's work can serve as a more faithful barometer of changing trends in twentieth
century Supreme Court commentary than the work of several of his behavioralist-inspired
colleagues who developed methodologies for studying the Court.
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Court over the next two decades.35 The methodology, voting
alignment analysis, produced the first sustained formulation of the
idea of a judicial canter in the literature of Supreme Court
commentary.
Pritchett began his description of voting alignment analysis with
a statement of its governing assumptions. He took "[t]he essential
nature of the task of a Supreme Court Justice" to be "not unlike that
of a Congressman. 3 6  Both were "confronted periodically with
important issues of public policy."37 Both needed to "formulate a
conclusion and register [a] vote"38 regarding such issues. And both
had a good measure of discretion in their decisionmaking:
[Although] theoretically, the legislator's discretion is much
wider than that of the judge ... from the accumulation of 150
years, precedents can be found to support almost any judicial
decision. Particularly in the high peaks of public law where the
Supreme Court moves, the fences are few and the Justices are
largely free to vote their convictions.39
Having described the Justices as political actors who dealt with
important issues of public policy and who were largely free,
notwithstanding legal doctrine, to vote their convictions, Pritchett
sought to characterize their jurisprudential stances through an
analysis of their voting behavior.4" His method consisted of an
exploration of the Justices' voting records "in terms of alignments and
issues."" Such an approach would expose "their respective attitudes,
as revealed in their answers to the legal questions propounded to the
Court."42  By "attitudes" he meant whether a Justice could be
described as on the "left," on the "right," or at the "center" of the
Court.43 By "answers to ... legal questions," he meant the Justices'
responses to the issues of social policy that particular public law cases
presented.44
35. Pritchett, Voting Behavior, supra note 18, passim. Pritchett used the technique in
several articles and two books between the early 1940s and the 1960s. See sources cited
supra notes 15, 18, and 19, and infra notes 56, 59, and 60. See also PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19, at 32-35.




40. Id. at 491-92.
41. Id. at 491.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 495-96.
44. See id. at 499-505.
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Pritchett's method required him to identify a sample of relevant
cases, to characterize the public policy issues in those cases, and to
describe the resolutionof those issues in ideological terms.45 Having
done so, he simply totaled up the votes of individual Justices in the
cases, noting at the same time the amount of times a Justice voted
with or against each of his colleagues.46 This enabled him to identify
"bloc[s]" of Justices who voted with one another on the "left" or
"right" sides of issues."7  It also, ultimately, enabled him to
characterize the perspectives of some Justices as being "at the center"
of the Court in a particular Term.4"
All of the steps in Pritchett's method required him to make
assumptions, some of them fairly heroic. His first assumption was
that only nonunanimous cases should be counted in the sample, which
resulted in his generalizations about the Justices being based on a
comparatively small sample of cases that he deemed particularly
significant.49 In the 1941 Term, for example, Pritchett's survey only
considered 59 of the 162 cases the Court decided with full opinions. °
The emphasis on nonunanimous opinions also resulted in the
sample's inclusion of some cases in which the Justices were divided
but whose policy implications were not obviously apparent. 1
Perhaps the most heroic assumption of Pritchett's methodology,
however, was not his decision to limit his sample to nonunanimous
cases but his choice of baselines for characterizing the voting
alignments he found. The baseline question was at once the most
potentially fruitful and the most potentially misleading step in
Pritchett's methodology. If he could convincingly label a group of
policy outcomes in cases as "left" or "right," and "blocs" of Justices
as consistently supporting "left" or "right" outcomes, then he could
arguably track the political sensibility of each member of the Court,
at least with respect to cases decided in one Term. But how was he to
determine which outcomes were "left" or "right"?
45. Id. at 499-506.
46. See id. at 492-98.
47. See id. at 495.
48. See id. at 495-96.
49. Id. at 492-97.
50. Id.
51. Pritchett found it significant that the Court had a lower percentage of unanimous
opinions in its 1941 Term than in any other Term for the past ten years, and produced a
Table demonstrating that finding. Id. at 493. But he did not indicate how many of the
nonunanimous opinions he surveyed in the 1941 Term included cases involving "important
issues of public policy," whose resolutions might have been susceptible to being
characterized as "left" or "right" outcomes. Id. at 491.
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Pritchett initially seemed to assume that his readers would take
his characterizations of outcomes in cases as self-evident. In his 1942
article he presented a chart of agreements among Justices in
dissenting opinions in the 1941 Term which demonstrated that some
Justices regularly joined the dissents of some of their colleagues, but
rarely joined the dissents of others.5 2 The chart, he conceded, "is by
no means a precise measure of the affinity between the Justices," but
"it does call attention to some important alignments."53 The chart
revealed that Justices William 0. Douglas, Hugo Black, and Frank
Murphy joined each others' dissents "quite often," and that Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Owen Roberts had joined each
other in dissent "on [twelve] occasions." 4  Pritchett described
Douglas, Black, and Murphy as "a bloc," and claimed that Roberts,
Stone, and Justice Felix Frankfurter were not "a bloc in the same
way," because although Frankfurter joined Stone in ten dissents,
Roberts only joined Frankfurter's dissents four times."
At this point, Pritchett's "chart of agreements" would only seem
to have tabulated how many times a particular Justice had joined the
dissenting opinions of his colleagues. Since the chart did not reveal
the grounds for a Justice's failure to join a dissenting opinion, or even
whether such a Justice had been with the majority or dissented
separately, it did not say much about what "agreement" meant, and,
on its face, did not seem to say anything about the political
sensibilities of the Justices.56 But Pritchett claimed that "Itlhe general
impression" of his chart was "that of a fairly definite left-wing bloc
composed of Douglas, Black, and Murphy, a less definite right-wing
pairing of Roberts and Stone, and a central group containing Justices
James Byrnes, Robert Jackson, and Stanley Reed, with Frankfurter
on the right fringe of this central group.
57
Pritchett initially gave no indication as to how he had determined




56. In a subsequent work, taking note of law professor Mark Howe's "doubt whether
the statistical analysis of Supreme Court opinions can, under any circumstances, be
fruitful," Pritchett noted that "the justices may agree as to the way a case should be
decided but for different reasons... one justice may have in mind the substantive problem
in the case, while for another it turns on a procedural question." C. HERMAN PRITCHETr,
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 275 (1954) [hereinafter PRITCHET-r, CIVIL
LIBERTIES] (quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe, Justice in a Democracy, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Dec. 1949, at 36). He felt that "these difficulties can be minimized by careful
and understanding handling of the data." Id.
57. Pritchett, Voting Behavior, supra note 18, at 495.
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that certain blocs of Justices were "left-wing" or "right-wing." In a
footnote in his 1942 article he said that "[t]he terms 'right' and 'left'
are used simply as convenient handles, with full realization of their
inadequacy in explaining the divisions of opinion of the Court and
their inaccuracy in describing the respective philosophies of the
justices."58 He continued to use the labels "left" and "right" to
describe groups of Justices in two subsequent articles on voting
alignments in the Court, one covering the 1943 Term5 9 and the other
summarizing data from the 1936 through the 1946 Terms.60
On closer investigation, the reasons Pritchett felt comfortable
designating blocs of Justices as "left" or "right" are clear. The step
that Pritchett regarded as most crucial to his voting alignment analysis
of Supreme Court decisionmaking was, as he put it in a 1945 article,
"what may be called the 'pattern' of dissent., 61 By tabulating the
number of times Justices dissented in nonunanimous cases, and
especially the number of times they joined other Justices in dissents,
Pritchett determined a "range between high and low agreement rates
as an index of relative moderation or extremism in judicial
attitudes."62 Justices on each wing had broad high-low agreement
rates.63
Once his tabulations determined groups of Justices who had high
agreement rates with some of their colleagues, and low agreement
rates with others, those Justices became candidates for being placed
in "blocs." He then associated the blocs with "wings of the Court."
The labels "left" and "right" conveyed Pritchett's rough impression of
the political philosophies of the Justices in the respective wings. For
example, in his 1942 article Pritchett said that the votes of Black,
Douglas, and Murphy in the 1941 Term:
[s]how them to be generally more concerned for the protection
of civil liberties and the rights of criminal defendants, more
likely to support the government in its tax and regulatory
policies, more desirous of limiting judicial review of
administrative action and more likely to vote for labor than
58. Id. at n.6.
59. C. Herman Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court 1943-44, 39 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 42 (1945) [hereinafter Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court].
60. C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: Votes and Values, 42 AM. POL. SC.
REv. 53 (1948) [hereinafter Pritchett, Votes and Values].
61. Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, supra note 59, at 44.
62. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 54 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
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their colleagues. 64
Those attitudes, in his view, merited the label "left."65
To underscore this point, Pritchett remainded his readers that
most of the Court's nonunanimous cases, in any given Term, raised
"[s]ubstantial issues of public policy," and that "the legal conclusions
of the Justices are invariably affected by their economic philosophy,
their political views, and the acuteness of their social conscience."66
He eventually divided cases with public policy implications into those
"involving civil liberties, rights of criminal defendants, federal
regulatory action, employer-employee controversies, anti-monopoly
issues, and state taxation and regulation problems."'67 The best
explanation for the votes of Justices in these lines of cases, he
suggested, was that "on these questions of public policy the justices
have conflicting preferences, and they vote ... to promote the policies
in which they believe."68  Thus "attitudes on civil liberties, labor,
monopoly, and the like are the primary values in terms of which the
judges have made their decisions."69
This closer look at the assumptions that drove Pritchett's voting
alignment analysis of the Justices who served on the Court in the
1940s reveals that his methodology was deeply invested in the
premises of judicial behavioralism. Not only did Pritchett assume
that Supreme Court Justices resembled a species of legislators,
deciding questions of public policy on the basis of their social and
economic preferences, he also assumed that the attitudes of Justices
could be determined exclusively on the basis of their voting patterns
in certain nonunanimous cases, those whose policy implications
seemed obvious to a commentator because they involved "civil
liberties," or labor issues, or the regulation of business.
In the articles in which Pritchett grouped Justices as belonging to
blocs, he devoted no attention to judicial language in the opinions
accompanying the votes that he tabulated. Even though he
recognized that "all the justices are impelled, more or less often, to
arrive at results in their decisions which they would never reach if
they had the freedom of legislative choice,"7 he did not feel the need
to incorporate any judicial statements saying as much into his
64. Pritchett, Voting Behavior, supra note 18, at 505.
65. Id. (claiming these attitudes were more akin to "the New Deal Stereotype").
66. Id. at 499.
67. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 66.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 67.
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analysis. Clearly, Pritchett thought if one took for granted that the
decisionmaking calculus of judges resembled that of legislators, and
that much constitutional doctrine was open-ended and malleable,
such statements were not worth dissecting.
In contrast, Pritchett believed that the outcomes in certain
categories of nonunanimous cases were quite revealing data. They
could demonstrate, by themselves, "the basic pattern of division on
the present Court," which was "between conflicting systems of
preferences on matters of social and economic policy."71 Outcomes in
certain cases were worth surveying, he felt, even when they did not
show any "conflicting systems of preferences."72  For example,
although Pritchett found that outcomes in "labor" cases in the 1943
Term only revealed that "the left wing" was "almost unanimous for
labor" and "the right wing (Roberts excepted) generally for labor,"73
he continued to use labor cases as a meaningful category for
determining "left" and "right" attitudes.74
B. Voting Alignment Analysis and the Judicial Center
Pritchett's voting alignment analysis produced the first durable
use of the term "center" as applied to Supreme Court Justices. On its
face, the term had only a technical meaning, derived from Pritchett's
methodology. "Center" or "central" Justices were those whose
ranges of agreement and disagreement with their colleagues, based on
voting alignments in the nonunanimous cases in Pritchett's sample,
were comparatively narrow.
Pritchett's initial formulation of the idea of a judicial center came
in his 1942 article, where he identified a "central group" of Justices,
consisting of Byrnes, Jackson, and Reed, and described Frankfurter
as "on the right fringe of this central group."75 His use of the term
"central" came after he had introduced a chart of agreements among
the Justices in dissenting opinions for the 1941 Term.76 The chart
described Douglas, Black, and Murphy as a "fairly definite left-wing
bloc" and Roberts and Stone "a less definite right-wing pairing."77 It
also revealed that Byrnes, Jackson, and Reed had joined dissents by
Douglas, Black, and Murphy approximately as often they had joined
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, supra note 59, at 51-52.
74. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 65.




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dissents by Roberts and Stone. Pritchett thus concluded that Byrnes,
Jackson, and Reed were "central Justices," as "likely to be found with
the right wing as with the left.
78
As Pritchett's methodology developed, it was clear that under his
definition of "center" a Justice who rarely dissented-indeed who
never filed a dissent at all-could be assigned to a "central" position
on the Court so long as the Court's majorities tended to be composed
of shifting "wings" of Justices who typically opposed each other. In
his 1942 article, Pritchett had described Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes as "located ... squarely at the center of balance on the
Court" during its 1931 Term.7 9 Pritchett's evidence was that Hughes
had agreed with "every [majority] decision rendered" in
nonunanimous cases, and that the competing wings on the Court that
Term were so "well-defined" that "members of one wing [Justices
James McReynolds, Pierce Butler, George Sutherland, and Willis
Van Devanter] never joined in a dissent with Justices in the other
group [Justices Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Stone, and
Roberts]."8
Pritchett described Hughes in a similar fashion in a 1945 article.
In the 1937 Term, Hughes did not file a single dissent. Pritchett
claimed that "the alignments into left and right wings" in that Term
"were clear-cut, regular, and almost symmetrical."8 But Roberts had
since moved from a "left" bloc to a bloc that included Sutherland,
Butler, and McReynolds: he was said to be "to [the] right" of
Hughes. Pritchett had characterized Hughes as "in the exact center
of the Court" simply because Hughes had consistently joined shifting
majorities composed of Justices on the "left" and "right" wings.82 He
was using the term "center" in a spatial sense.
But as Pritchett began to expand voting alignment analysis to
cover larger segments of time, he encountered, as his
characterizations of Hughes and Roberts illustrated, the tendency of
judicial postures, and judicial "blocs," to shift from one Term to
another. In a 1948 article in which Pritchett surveyed the percentage
of agreements among Justices for a time span covering the 1931
through the 1946 Terms, he stated that between the 1931 and 1935
Terms, where the personnel of the Court did not change, there were
"three clearly defined blocs which can be referred to as the left,
78. Id.
79. Id. at 496.
80. Id.




center, and right of the Court."83 The "center of the Court" consisted
of Hughes and Roberts, and their "central" status was determined by
Pritchett's usual method: their ranges of agreement with other
Justices were comparatively narrow in a setting in which the ranges of
agreement of Justices located in "wings" of the Court were quite
broad, and thus they occupied space at the Court's center.84
But by the 1937 Term, Pritchett claimed, a personnel change had
begun to affect the ranges of agreement among the Justices. Justice
Black had replaced Van Devanter, and "he was too far to the left for
any of the other justices except Cardozo."85  By that statement
Pritchett meant to convey two rather different ideas. First, when one
examined the percentages and ranges of agreement among Justices in
nonunanimous cases, only Cardozo agreed with Black substantially
(88% of the time) in a setting in which Black's range of agreement
and disagreement with other Justices was quite broad, ranging from
88% to 9%. 81 Second, two other members of a "left" bloc, Brandeis
and Stone, did not agree with Black as often (70% and 68% of the
time) as Cardozo did.87 This was particularly interesting, Pritchett
felt, because Hughes had agreed with Black 67% of the time, and
Roberts had agreed with Black 64% of the time.88 Hence, Pritchett
decided that "the more moderate left-wing members" of the Court
had "merged with the center" that Term.89
The two uses of the term judicial "center" described above did
not convey the same message, and another passage in Pritchett's 1948
article demonstrates that he had come to use his concept of the range
between high and low agreement rates in a Justice in two different
ways. In discussing the "central" status of Hughes and Roberts on
the Court between 1931 and 1936, Pritchett said:
[T]he center of the Court consisted of Hughes and Roberts.
This pair had their highest rates of agreement with each other
and with the more moderate left- and right-wing justices .... It
is a characteristic of center justices that they have neither very
83. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 55.
84. Id. at 55-59. Over a five-year period Pritchett found that in the sample of
nonunanimous decisions he took to be relevant, Stone had agreed with "right" bloc
members only 20% of the time and "left" bloc members 89% of the time, whereas Butler
had agreed with "right" bloc members 87% of the time and "left" bloc members 20% of
the time. Id.
85. Id. at 60.
86. Id. at 56.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 60.
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high nor very low rates of agreement with their colleagues on
either side of the Court.... These data suggest the possibility
of using the range between high and low agreement rates as an
index of relative moderation or extremism in judicial
attitudes.... A range of 100 would be evidence of extreme
opposing attitudes, while a range of zero would mark a
moderate justice who was a kind of common denominator for
his brethren. Broad ranges are characteristic of the justices on
the two wings of the Court, and narrow ranges mark the center
justices.0
It was not clear from the passage whether Pritchett meant to
imply, in associating a broad range of agreement rates with
"extremism in judicial attitudes" and a narrow range with
"moderation," that "center" Justices were politically moderate
persons, or whether he was simply repeating his previous claim that
Justices at the center of a Court tended to occupy a space determined
by the roughly equal proportions of their agreement and
disagreement with their colleagues in sampled cases. In his previous
voting alignment studies of the Court, Pritchett had suggested that
the only criterion for placing Justices in "blocs" and "wings" was their
tendency to regularly agree, or regularly disagree, with one another in
nonunanimous cases with discernible policy implications.9" But the
above passage, taken together with statements such as "[Black] was
too far to the left for any of the other justices except Cardozo ' '9 and
"the more moderate left-wing members merged to the center,"
93
implied that "extreme opposing attitudes" in Justices were a function
of political ideology, and hence a "central" location on a Court might
be a location on a political spectrum.
The rest of Pritchett's 1948 article did not pursue this potential
alternative meaning of "center." He referred to a "new left-wing
alignment" in the 1938 Term, a new "center" in that Term,
"composed of Reed, Stone, Brandeis, and Hughes," a "very solid left"
in the 1939 Term, and a "center," for that Term, composed of
Frankfurter, Reed, and Stone.94 Those comments suggested that the
designation of Justices in the center of the Court was purely a
function of their tending to agree or disagree, during a given Term, in
90. Id. at 55, 59.
91. See Pritchett, Voting Behavior, supra note 18, at 494-98.
92. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 60.
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roughly equal proportions with "left" and "right" Justices. Even
Pritchett's statement that there was "no particular cohesiveness in the
center" in the 1941 Term seemed only to mean that several Justices,
some of them previously associated with "left" blocs and others with
"right" blocs, had exhibited narrow ranges of agreement in
nonunanimous cases.
95
As Pritchett began to struggle with the use of the labels "left,"
"right," and "center" over longer segments of time, his data for the
1948 article revealed another development that threatened to make
those categories even less precise. That development was the
noticeable narrowing of the range of agreement among Justices after
the 1940 Term.
Between the 1936 and 1940 Terms the average range of
agreements among Justices had been quite broad: 68, 75, 76, 69, and
67 points. This meant that most of the Justices on the Court were
agreeing with some of their colleagues a good deal, but others rarely.
For nine Justices to average a range of agreement that spanned 75
and 76 points, on a 100 point scale, meant that there were very high
patterns of concordance and disagreement among several Justices, at
least in the cases Pritchett sampled.96
In contrast, between the 1941 and 1946 Terms the average range
of agreement in the nonunanimous cases in Pritchett's sample97 was
95. The ranges of agreement for all the Justices on the Court except Black and
Douglas were low in the 1941 Term. Roberts's and Stone's ranges were 47, Murphy 44,
Frankfuter 36, Jackson 26, Bymes 16, and Reed 11. Id. at 57. Frankfurter, who had
agreed with Douglas and Black 100% of the time in the 1938 Term, agreed with Douglas
34% of the time and Black 36% of the time in the 1941 term. Id. at 56. Stone had agreed
with Black 81% of the time and Douglas 80% of the time in the 1939 Term. Id. He
agreed with Black 25% of the time and Douglas 23% of the time in the 1941 Term. Id. at
57.
96. In nonunanimous opinions in the 1936 Term, Cardozo agreed with Stone 100% of
the time, and Brandeis 90% of the time. Id. at 55. Stone agreed with Brandeis 91% of the
time; Cardozo agreed with McReynolds 13% of the time; Stone agreed with McReynolds
17% of the time; and Brandeis agreed with McReynolds 17% of the time. Id.
In nonunanimous opinions in the 1938 Term, Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter
agreed with one another 100% of the time. They never agreed with McReynolds. Id. at
56. They agreed with Butler 6%, 9%, and 5% of the time, respectively. Id.
97. It is important to recall that Pritchett's version of voting alignment analysis did not
consider all nonunanimous cases. He was only interested in surveying nonunanimous
outcomes that he felt comfortable categorizing in ideological terms. A case such as Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, for example, was not part of Pritchett's sample because it was,
technically, not a "nonunanimous" outcome (Erie was decided 8-0, with three Justices
concurring and one Justice, Cardozo, not participating). 304 U.S. 64, 68 (1938). In
addition, Erie did not fall into any of the categories of cases that Pritchett treated as
raising issues of public policy with distinct ideological ramifications. Erie was, of course,
one of the most significant Court decisions of the twentieth century, and the issue it
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41, 43, 39, 46, 28, and 37. And if one eliminated Justices Black and
Douglas from the sample (even those Justices' ranges of agreement
did not exceed 72 for those Terms), the ranges of agreement for all
the other members of the Court varied from 58 to 11 for that time
interval.98 In the 1945 Term the ranges of agreement for all the
Justices, including Black and Douglas, varied from 38 to 21. 99 In the
1946 Term it varied from 46 to 30.100 In short, Pritchett's principal
criterion for "center" Justices-those who had neither very high nor
very low rates of agreement with their colleagues-suggested that all
the Justices on the Court in the 1945 and 1946 Terms were in a
"center" bloc.
Pritchett had difficulty reconciling that trend with his voting
alignment approach to the Court's decisions. At one point he
advanced a conclusory explanation for the trend, stating that "all the
justices have more in common with colleagues on the other side of the
Court, and less in common with members of their own wing, than was
previously the case." '' At another point he seemed to back away
from any explanation, stating that the data he had collected on the
ranges of voting agreements among Justices "throws no light on the
values in terms of which the justices have made their decisions, and
affords no explanation of judicial motivation."'0 2 The last statement
flew in the face of his initial reasons for adopting voting alignment
studies of the Court.
In each of his articles discussed above, Pritchett made an effort
to link voting patterns to judicial preferences on matters of social
policy. Although one might quarrel with his categories of cases
raising discernible policy issues, or his association of support for
particular outcomes in those cases with "left" or "right" judicial
perspectives, Pritchett had invested the terms "left" and "right" with
some fairly determinate content.'013 In a 1945 article, he had suggested
resolved-whether federal courts entertaining common law cases because of diversity of
citizenship between the parties were bound to follow state law decisions relevant to the
issues in those cases-was perceived, at the time Erie was decided, as having important
ideological ramifications. See EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION 199-201 (2000).
98. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 56.
99. Id. at 58.
100. Id. at 59.
101. Id. at 61.
102. Id.
103. Compare the definitions of "conservative" and "liberal," as applied to Justices on
the Warren Court, by a political scientist writing a decade after Pritchett's studies
appeared. Clyde E. Jacobs applied the term "conservative" to "those justices who support
a relatively restrictive interpretation of civil liberties-both constitutional and statutory,"
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that even when most of the Justices on the Court could be described
as "liberals," divisions between them were "still explicable in terms of
differing degrees of orientation toward left or right." ' 4 "Liberalism,"
Pritchett felt, "is a realm broad enough for the development of its
own left and right wings."' 5
Although Pritchett noted that the Court's "left" and "right"
wings seemed to be breaking down after the 1940 Term, he did not
acknowledge that the trend was damaging to the coherence of his
characterization of some Justices as being in the "center" of the
Court. Under Pritchett's voting alignment analysis, center judges
were given that label because they voted roughly equally with "left"
or "right" blocs. Their "central" position on the Court only became
intelligible if the blocs themselves had some integrity. Pritchett had
designed his "blocs" and "wings" on the Court to have substantive
content: they signaled "left" or "right" patterns of judicial voting on
policy issues.
In short, Pritchett's formulation of the idea that some Justices
were located in the center of a Court had never been purely spatial.
Calling Justices "central" because of their narrow range of
agreements with their colleagues was only a meaningful designation
when "left" and "right" blocs on a Court were clearly visible. And
since the labels affixed to those blocs signified ideological
perspectives, so did a "central" position. Justices at the center of a
Court appeared to be those whose ideology was roughly midway
between "left" and "right." They appeared to be political moderates,
if one thought of uniformly left and uniformly right ideological
perspectives as occupying the extremes of an American political
spectrum. Thus, Pritchett's claim that his data on ranges of
agreements said nothing about judicial values seemed at war with his
own methodology.
Once Pritchett's own data revealed that all the Justices on the
Court in the 1945 and 1946 Terms had narrow ranges of agreement in
nonunanimous cases, the idea of a judicial center, in the sense in
which Pritchett had expressed it, no longer seemed to be a coherent
analytical concept. The "center" of the Court in the 1945 and 1946
Terms, according to voting alignment analysis, was virtually all-
inclusive. And since the whole point of voting alignment analysis was
and the term "liberal" as "interchangeabl[e] with libertarian." Jacobs, supra note 15, at
937 n.3.
104. Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, supra note 59, at 53-54.
105. Id.
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to permit commentators to discern the "conflicting systems of
preferences on matters of social and economic policy"' 6 exhibited by
Justices on the Supreme Court, placing Justices at the "center" of a
Court whose members exhibited strikingly narrow ranges of
agreement was no help in discerning those systems of preferences.
C. Judicial Behavioralism and the "Activism "-"Restraint" Debate in
Political Science
1. The Reconfiguration of Judicial Labels
In the 1948 article in which he had pointed out the deterioration
of clearly defined opposing blocs of Justices on the Court, Pritchett
had also noted that some commentators were suggesting "that the
present split" among the Justices was "not primarily along liberal-
conservative lines," but was instead "a battle of judicial activists
against apostles of judicial restraint."'17 That statement revealed the
emergence of a line of commentary, in the years after World War II,
which sought to explain how a Court whose members had been
appointed exclusively by two Democratic Presidents, Franklin
Roosevelt and Harry Truman, could be dividing more frequently in
visible cases, and producing more dissenting opinions, than the Court
of the mid-1930s, which had allegedly contained two incompatible
blocs of "conservative" and "liberal" Justices.
0 8
One of the earliest examples of that line of commentary was a
1947 article by the political historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. on the
Vinson Court.10 9  Schlesinger began the article by referring to
"Roosevelt's Supreme Court," and subsequently noted that "[o]n
106. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 67.
107. Id.
108. Pritchett's statistics revealed that in the 1935, 1936, and 1937 Terms, when the
Court was ostensibly split between two wings of Justices that opposed and supported New
Deal legislation and complementary social welfare legislation at the state level, the total
number of dissenting votes cast by Justices ranged between 80 and 88, or between .50 and
.52 dissenting votes cast per opinion. Id. at 54. In contrast, in the 1944, 1945, and 1946
Terms, the number of dissenting votes cast ranged between 156 and 246, or between 1.14
and 1.71 dissenting votes per opinion. Id.
109. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, 35 FORTUNE 73 (1947). In
a 1955 book review, political scientist J.H. Leek stated that Schlesinger's article was the
first to popularize the terms "judicial activism" and "judicial self-restraint" as labels for
opposing jurisprudential perspectives. J.H. Leek, Book Review, 8 OKLA. L. REV. 127, 128
(1955). 1 have been unable to find any earlier use of the terms in print. In a November 18,
2004 conversation with the author, Schlesinger stated that he "borrowed" the terms
"activism" and "self-restraint" from Harvard Law Professor Thomas Reed Powell, who
frequently commented on the Court. See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, Our High Court
Analyzed, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,1944, § 6 (Magazine), at 17.
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basic questions of the power to govern, this Court stands united." '
He believed, however, that "a fundamental conflict" had emerged
among the Vinson Court Justices "over the proper function of the
judiciary in a democracy." '' The central labels Schlesinger used to
describe that conflict were judicial "activism" and judicial "self-
restraint."1 2 Activists, such as Black and Douglas, believed "that the
Supreme Court can play an affirmative role in promoting the social
welfare."1 3 Apostles of restraint, such as Frankfurter and Jackson,
wanted "to give the legislature discretion ... to resist judicial
supremacy, either of the right or of the left.""1 4
The debate between activists and advocates of restraint,
Schlesinger felt, was "not a debate between conservatives and
liberals," as nearly "the entire Court" was "made up of New
Dealers.""11 It was a debate between those who wanted to "use [the]
political power [of the Court] for wholesome social purposes'1 6 and
those who believed that when the Court "substitut[ed] its own for the
legislative preference," it moved "toward a state of judicial despotism
that threatens the democratic process. '  One wing appeared to be
"more concerned with settling particular cases in accordance with
their own social preconceptions"; the other with "preserving the
judiciary in its established but limited place in the American
system.""
n8
Schlesinger felt that there was something to be said for both
positions. Advocates of self-restraint touched a chord when they
argued that "[t]he price of [judicial] policymaking ... must inevitably
be political reprisal," and that the Court was "sap[ping] the vigor of
our democracy" and "encouraging legislatures in an irresponsibility"
when it too readily intervened to review legislation." 9 On the other
hand, activists might well be accurate in surmising that "in actual
practice" legislatures were not self-correcting, and "harm, possibly
irreparable, [was] done to defenseless persons.' ' 20  He ultimately
concluded that "[t]he larger interests of democracy in the U.S. require
110. Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 73, 201.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 74, 76.
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id. at 208.
116. Id. at 202.
117. Id. at 204.
118. Id. at 201.
119. Id. at 204.
120. Id. at 206.
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that the Court contract rather than expand its power," so that most
policy questions should "be entrusted as completely as possible to
institutions directly responsive to popular control."'21 The exception,
he believed, following a "doctrine" announced by Stone in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,122 was when "laws restrict political
agitation. '"I
Pritchett had not initially been persuaded that divisions on the
Court could helpfully be characterized as reflecting postures of
activism or restraint. As late as 1948 he continued to insist that "the
range of discretion which is available to a member of the Court is
quite wide enough to permit his personal values to exercise a
controlling influence in a considerable proportion of his decisions." '124
Moreover, he argued, "evidence is lacking ... that any justice has
been able to avoid writing his personal preferences into law.""l The
"basic pattern of division on the present Court," Pritchett concluded,
"is still between conflicting systems of preferences on matters of
social and economic policy." '26
In two books he produced between 1948 and 1954,27 however,
Pritchett admitted that the terms "activism" and "restraint" had the
merit of capturing opposing views on a question that had come to be
central for the Court in those years: when should the Supreme Court
decide that "persons under the protection of the American
Constitution were entitled to have [it] act directly to safeguard them
from [majorities]"? 12 8  As cases raising that question repeatedly
surfaced in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Pritchett recognized that a
discernibly "liberal" Court had needed to "bear constantly in mind
the necessity of judicial self-restraint" because a "policy of judicial
activism sponsored by a liberal court [was] no more consistent with
the democratic process than a like conservative policy." 29 Eventually
Pritchett was to conclude, after using voting alignment analysis to
identify patterns of division on the Court between the 1946 and 1952
Terms, that those patterns could be more accurately described in
terms of the activism-restraint debate than in the traditional labels of
121. Id. at 208.
122. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
123. Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 206.
124. Pritchett, Votes and Values, supra note 60, at 67.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. PRrrcHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19; PRITCHETr, CIVIL
LIBERTIES, supra note 56.
128. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19, at 284.
129. Id. at 286.
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liberalism and conservatism. 130
2. The Activism-Restraint Debate and the Judicial Center
The meaning of Pritchett's terms "central" and "center," already
stripped of precision by the narrow ranges of agreement among the
Court's Justices in the 1940s and 1950s, was further obfuscated by the
interjection of the terms "activism" and "restraint" to describe the
postures of Justices. In his 1948 book on the Court, Pritchett
discussed how the narrowing of ranges of agreement required him to
abandon the terms "liberal" and "conservative" as labels. The labels
were only useful, he felt, if the "judicial blocs" he identified were
coherent, so that "[in only a very few instances did a justice in one
wing find himself dissenting in company with a justice from the other
wing. '131 Once divisions on the Court became more varied in the
1940s, and range of agreements narrowed, Pritchett avoided the
terms, believing that they could no longer capture "opposed
complexes of preferences in matters of public policy.
1 32
Pritchett did not, however, abandon the terms "left," "center,"
and "right" as "locations of the justices. ' 13  He believed that if those
terms were used spatially, "a strictly relative sense indicating
direction of deviation away from the majority view of the Court at
any given time," they remained useful."3 But it was hard to know
what the term "center" could mean under those definitions. We have
already seen that equating the "center" with the position endorsed by
a cumulative majority of the Justices in cases with public policy
implications threatened to make the term unintelligible when Justices
on a Court had narrow ranges of agreement. When the criteria of
activism and deference were offered as additional variables affecting
a Justice's voting posture, the label "center" seemed even less helpful.
If a case with public policy implications came up, and a majority
of Justices endorsed a particular outcome, Pritchett assumed that the
outcome represented the "center" of the Court for that case.135 If he
then felt comfortable characterizing the outcome as "left" or "right"
on a spectrum of policy preferences, he could use cumulative voting
alignments to chart the position of the Court as a whole in a given
130. PRITCHETr, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 227.
131. PRITCHET'r, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19, at 33.
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Term.136 That sort of analysis lay behind Pritchett's characterization
of the Roosevelt Court, in the years 1937 through 1947, as a "liberal"
Court, or, more precisely, as a Court whose "center" (cumulative
majority position) favored "left" rather than "right" policy
outcomes. 137 But it was hard to know how Pritchett's analysis
illuminated the perspectives of individual Justices on the Court. If a
Justice repeatedly voted with majorities, Pritchett's terminology did
not clarify whether he was a "center" Justice or a "left" Justice. It did
not reveal whether the reasons a Justice voted with majorities were
connected to his position in the activist-restraint debate or his
substantive views on policy issues. For example, Frankfurter, whom
Pritchett characterized as a "libertarian" on the Vinson Court
between 1946 and 1952,138 occasionally joined Vinson Court
majorities to uphold legislation restricting civil liberties. 39 Pritchett
did not indicate whether these votes made Frankfurter a "center"
judge on that Court, and if so, how his position differed from that of
other members of Vinson Court majorities in civil liberties cases,
whom Pritchett believed to be hostile to civil liberties claims on
substantive grounds."
In short, although the introduction of the terms "judicial
activism" and "judicial restraint" into commentary on the Court may
have helped scholars, such as Pritchett and Schlesinger, clarify
divisions among Stone and Vinson Court Justices who appeared to be
generally supportive of liberal policies, it failed to sharpen the
meaning of the labels "center" or "central" for Justices on those
Courts. If the term "center" only designated the position of a judge
who agreed and disagreed with his colleagues in roughly equal
proportions, it applied to too many Justices in the 1940s and early
1950s to be distinctive.141  If it signified a "moderate" stance
somewhere between "left" and "right" perspectives, one could not
tell whether the votes that had produced that stance were the result of
policy preferences or theories about the judicial function.142 When
136. Id.
137. Id. at 264.
138. PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 190,201.
139. See id. at 201-05, 224-25.
140. See id. at 227-31.
141. For an example, see Pritchett's tables summarizing the range of agreements
among Justices in nonunanimous opinions for the 1946-1952 Terms. PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19, at 182, 184 (Tables 5 and 7).
142. Pritchett used the term "center" at one point to describe the voting patterns of
Chief Justice Fred Reed, Justice Vinson, and Justice Harold Burton in nonunanimous
cases during the 1946, 1947, and 1948 Terms. Id. at 182. But he conceded that "[tihe
tables ... do not relate the divisions to issues or throw any light on why the justices voted
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Pritchett eventually came to label Vinson Court Justices on the basis
of their "voting record ... in federal and state civil liberties cases"
between 1946 and 1953,143 he used the terms "libertarian activist,"1"
"libertarian restraint," '145 and "the Vinson majority," who were "less
libertarian. '146 He did not employ the terms "center" or "central."
The difficulties Pritchett encountered with his use of the term
"center" were a function of his effort to confine the term to a spatial
meaning even though his methodology presupposed that the judicial
locations of "left" and "right" had a political meaning. On the one
hand, Pritchett sought to be the objective behavioral scientist, simply
recording the votes of Justices in certain nonunanimous cases and
assigning them spatial positions on a political voting spectrum whose
"left" and "right" ends he and his audience took to be readily
demonstrable. On the other hand, however, the location of Justices
on the "left" or "right" was intended to have distinct political
overtones: Pritchett was ultimately seeking to characterize the
Vinson Court's responsiveness to civil liberties issues, and to equate
judicial responsiveness to civil liberties concerns with a "left" position
on the political spectrum. So the characterization of a Justice at "the
center" of a Court was bound to be taken as having some political
overtones even when Pritchett intended it primarily as a spatial
characterization.
147
II. JUDICIAL BEHAVIORALISM AND PROCESS THEORY IN THE 1950s
AND 1960s
This Section argues that in the same period that the categories of
as they did." Id. at 186.
143. Id. at 225.
144. Id. at 192.
145. Id. at 202.
146. Id. at 227.
147. A passage from Civil Liberties, supra note 56, will illustrate this difficulty. After
presenting a table summarizing the range of agreement and disagreement among Justices
in dissenting opinions from the 1946 through the 1948 Terms, Pritchett said that the table
"brings out ... very clearly the four-judge left, the three-judge center, and the two-judge
right." Id. at 182. He meant those labels to be understood spatially, since he spoke of the
"average interagreement rates" of the Justices in the groups being high ("73.5, 76, and
74[%] respectively"). Id. But he then subsequently said that: "[t]he death of Murphy and
Rutledge in the summer of 1949 and their replacement by Clark and Minton was bound to
cause a reorientation on the Court. The expectation was that the two new appointees
would generally align themselves with the Court's center group." Id. It is hard to imagine
that "the expectation" to which Pritchett referred was based on anything but an
anticipated political agenda. "[T]he Court's center group" thus had an ideological as well
as a spatial connotation. Pritchett did not acknowledge this in his book Civil Liberties. See
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activism and restraint were complicating behavioralist analysis of the
Court by political scientists, the implications of judicial behavioralism
were serving to turn the direction of legal commentary toward an
increased emphasis on the theories of the judicial function advanced
by Justices in their public law decisions. Between the early 1950s and
the mid 1960s, an influential line of scholarship by legal academics
argued that the "processes" of Supreme Court decisionmaking-such
as the decision to use, or to decline to use, the Court's certiorari
power to resolve conflicting lines of lower court decisions, the level of
doctrinal generality employed by Justices in opinions, and the explicit
and implicit theories of the Court's constitutional authority expressed
in opinions-were the most important features of the Court's
performance, far more important than the actual results the Court
reached. Close study of those features, this line of scholarship
suggested, would not merely reveal that the categories of activism and
restraint were far more helpful than labels such as "liberal" and
''conservative" in analyzing the performance of Supreme Court
Justices. It would also illustrate the crucial importance of theories of
the judicial function in understanding the dynamics of the Court.148
Because the literature of process jurisprudence tended to be
critical of behavioralist political science studies of the Court,4 9 and in
some instances appeared to be affirming the integrity of "neutral"
legal principles that transcended the short-run policy outcomes of
cases, 5 ' the behavioralist starting premises of process theorists may
be underappreciated. Process jurisprudence is best understood as an
effort to domesticate, rather than to reject, judicial behavioralism.
One might compare, with Pritchett's comment in the 1940s that the
decisionmaking calculus of a judge resembled that of a legislator, a
1966 statement made by Lon Fuller, one of the most visible
148. The literature on process theory, both as a general jurisprudential perspective and
as a "school" of Supreme Court commentary, is vast. I am focusing here on only a
selected number of works that are relevant to the evolving idea of a judicial center in that
commentary. On the historical and jurisprudential dimensions of process theory, see
DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 205-99; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION [hereinafter WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION] 292-368 (2d ed.
1988); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136-63 (1978).
The first work to use the term "process" to historicize the line of commentary was Bruce
Ackerman, Book Review, 103 DAEDALUS 119 (1974). Compare the less felicitous term
employed in G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, passim (1973).
149. See Fuller, supra note 34 passim; Henry M. Hart, Foreword to The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
150. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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proponents of process theory:
It would be foolish to assert that when judges are engaged in
solving problems all their personal attitudes and values become
dissipated in a bright glow of objectivity. The final solution
may well be skewed in one direction or another by something
that may be termed a personal.., predilection.'
Fuller followed this statement, however, by insisting that
although what judges "wish to achieve" was guided by "some felt
need, or by a sense of what is right and just, or simply by personal
preference," the "choice of means" was "a matter of rational
calculations. '152 And in judicial decisionmaking "means and ends
mov[ed] in circles of reciprocal influence." '153 Once one understood
that the "social aims" of judges could not be separated "from the
institutional means essential for achieving them," any analysis of the
decisions of judges needed to take into account not only "judicial
statements about ends [but also] judicial solutions for the problem of
means."'
154
The reciprocal relationship between the ends and the means of a
judicial decision-the ways in which judicial opinions grounded their
results in doctrinal ratiocinations and implicit or explicit theories of
the judicial function-was the primary focus of process theorists.
Their analytical goal was to improve the judicial elaboration of
doctrinal principles and to make judges more self-conscious about the
boundaries of their institutional authority in a society governed by
democratic theory. Their normative goal was to justify a limited
measure of lawmaking by judges by preventing the sort of willful,
subjective, unreasoned judicial decisions that might encourage critics
of the judiciary to conclude that those decisions were nothing but the
products of biased humans whose office afforded them legal power.
It was inevitable, given the goals of process theorists, that their
scholarship would turn away from behavioralist-inspired voting
analysis to approaches that emphasized doctrinal and institutional
constraints on judges. It was therefore inevitable that they would find
the categories of activism and restraint more fruitful criteria for
evaluating the performance of Supreme Court Justices than
categories derived from voting patterns and employing political labels
such as "left" or "right." The emergence of process theory literature
151. Fuller, supra note 34, at 1619.
152. Id. at 1626.
153. Id. at 1627.
154. Id.
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served to underscore the perceived importance of the axes of activism
and restraint in characterizing the stance of Supreme Court Justices,
and eventually-as Pritchett's work illustrated-political scientists
who conducted voting alignment studies began to use the terms as
well.15
A. The Transformation of the Activism-Restraint Categories
In 1948, Arthur Sutherland, a law professor at Cornell and a
former clerk to Justice Holmes, wrote, in reviewing Pritchett's The
Roosevelt Court:
By and large, practicing lawyers are open to criticism for not
explaining to the public ... what law is, and how it is
administered.... [C]onstitutions and statutes cannot possibly
provide in detail for all the infinite varieties of human conflict;
[] broad standards are the most that can be prescribed; and []
men, more or less wise, patient, and well-informed, must apply
these standards to specific situations. Human beings, that is to
say, make the actual rules of conduct.... That judges are
human, like other men, and that their emotions, their
experiences, their background all affect their ideas of the
meaning of a phrase like "due process of law" can surprise only
those who never ... read any of the recent books on the
Supreme Court .... The "doctrine of judicial self-restraint
operated in Holmes's day to protect liberal state and federal
programs of economic legislation from invalidation by
reactionary courts. But what happens when the courts become
liberal and are confronted with the product of reactionary
legislatures?" Is it still "liberal" to sit back and let the statute
stand?
15 6
Comments such as Sutherland's suggest that in the late 1940s
legal commentators had not fully disengaged the activism-restraint
debate from conventional political labeling of the Justices'
perspectives.157 But in a 1951 article by Louis Jaffe, assessing the
Court's performance in its 1950 Term, one can observe evidence that
the activism-restraint debate had taken on some additional
155. See, e.g., PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 201-02.
156. Arthur Sutherland, Book Review, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 282-83 (1948) (reviewing
and quoting PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19).
157. Id. For additional examples, see Note, Mr. Justice Reed-Swing Man or Not?, 1
STAN. L. REV. 714, 718 (1949).
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implications. 5 " In Jaffe's usage, judicial restraint had come to be
associated not simply with opposition to aggressive judicial scrutiny of
"conservative" or "liberal" legislation, but also for the maintenance
of a distinction between unseemly judicial policymaking and prudent,
reasoned judicial adjudication.159
Jaffe began the article by noting that the "Black-Murphy-
Douglas-Rutledge bloc" had "held a pivotal position" on "[t]he
Roosevelt Court," and had interpreted constitutional and statutory
law "to forward its program of social reform."1" This comment might
have been made by Pritchett. Jaffe next claimed, however, that "the
Court's work," for much of the 1940s, "was not law but politics.' 16 It
reflected "an excess of passion for immediate results, a naive
expectation that ... all things could be quickly put right.' ' 1 62  His
objection was not to the substance of the results reached by the Court
but to the fact that it had insufficiently emphasized "the stating of
reasons" justifying its decisions.163  Although the Court in the 1950
Term was far less dedicated to furthering social reform, Jaffe
suggested, its opinions remained insufficiently justified. 6
Jaffe's article suggested that more was at stake in the activism-
restraint debate than whether judges should protect civil liberties or
leave their fate to legislatures. A judicial decision to overrule another
branch of government, or to defer to it, needed to be grounded in a
carefully articulated statement of legal reasons justifying the
decision.'65 The articulation of cogent legal reasons for judicial results
was a core function of judges because, in a constitutional democracy,
they had the ultimate power to decide questions of law but an
obligation to square their decisions with democratic theory. An
"excess of passion for immediate results" in pursuit of a "program of
social reform" could adversely affect the production of fully
158. Louis L. Jaffe, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REV. 107
(1951).
159. Id. at 107.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 110.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 114. Jaffe's article suggests that in the years in which process jurisprudence
first emerged, the goal of its adherents was not to challenge the assumptions of judicial
behavioralism, nor to object to the policies furthered by "liberal activists" on the Court,
but to claim that the line between illegitimate judicial "politics" and defensible judge-
made "law" centered on the production of judicial opinions that provided adequately
reasoned legal justifications for the outcomes they reached. Id. at 107-14. See also
DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 223-36,258-62 (intimating the same).
165. Jaffe, supra note 158, at 110.
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considered and elaborated legal reasons. 166
Just as he had taken note of Schlesinger's use of the terms
"judicial activism" and "judicial restraint," Pritchett took note of the
expanded dimensions of the activism-restraint debate illustrated by
work such as Jaffe's. As he gave more consideration to the postures
of activism and restraint in his studies of the Court in the 1950s,
Pritchett noticed that the conception of judicial restraint had become
refined from its earlier articulations, as in Schlesinger's 1947 article,
where it primarily centered on the judicial choice to defer to, or to
invalidate, legislative policies.167  By the mid-1950s, Pritchett had
recognized that the posture of judicial restraint potentially applied to
a number of other instances in which courts served as "the
instruments of political and social accommodation and adjustment in
a complicated governmental system."'16 8 Judicial restraint, Pritchett
came to believe, was a posture that emphasized "appropriate judicial
standards and proper... judicial techniques. '
As such, Pritchett noted, judicial restraint was potentially
implicated in cases involving the reach of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, such as those seeking constitutional definitions of "cases
and controversies" and of "political questions,' 70 or those raising
technical jurisdictional issues, such as whether a case was ripe for
review, had been rendered moot, or could not be entertained because
the moving party lacked standing to bring it. 7 ' It was also implicated
in separation-of-powers cases where courts were reviewing the acts of
executive or administrative officials.'72 It was implicated in federalism
cases, testing the Court's power to review the actions of state courts
and legislatures and to allocate powers between Congress and the
states.173  And it was implicated in a series of techniques for
postponing or avoiding full-blown decisions on constitutional
questions in order to prevent courts from being drawn into
consideration of issues that were still percolating in the body politic.
174
B. Elevating the Ideological Stakes of the Activism-Restraint Debate
A cottage industry of legal scholarship would develop around
166. id. at 107, 110.
167. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, supra note 19, at 278.
168. PRITCHETr, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 201.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 202.
171. Id. at 220-24.
172. Id. at 203, 224.
173. Id. at 213.
174. Id. at 222.
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"process" dimensions of judicial restraint in the 1950s and 1960s.
Legal commentators increasingly began to emphasize what they
called the "craft" dimensions of judicial restraint, urging judges to be
attentive to the limited scope of the Court's institutional powers, to
avoid the summary or peremptory judicial resolution of complicated
questions, and to derive durable, transcendent constitutional
principles on which to ground the resolution of divisive cases.1 5 As
those craft dimensions of judging became more prominent in process
jurisprudence, the ideological stakes of the activism-restraint debate
were elevated. In the hands of process theorists, judicial restraint
became associated with the preservation of a distinction between
principled judicial decisionmaking that upheld the rule of law in a
constitutional democracy and willful judicial policymaking in the
service of desired social results.
By the late 1950s, judicial restraint had become a normative ideal
espoused by both scholars and judges. The most visible evidence of
the attraction of scholars to judicial restraint came in a series of
articles, many of them in the Harvard Law Review, that criticized the
Court on three related grounds, summarized by Philip Kurland in
1959.176 One ground was the misguided belief of some Justices "that
their function is to utilize the power at hand for the accomplishment
of those ends of 'social justice' which they conceive to be
appropriate."' 77 A second was the production of "too many opinions
which obfuscate rather than enlighten." '178 The third was the tendency
of some Justices, "who regard themselves as sitting as a court of
errors and appeals," to take too many cases that were "of importance
only to the immediate litigants" because they had caught the fancy of
"four members of the Court," the number required to ensure that a
petition for certiorari would be entertained. 79
175. For a fuller compilation of literature exemplifying this "process" perspective, see
DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 236-82.
176. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. REV.
457, 465-66 (1959).
177. Id. at 463. The strongest statements of this view made in the 1950s came in two
lectures at Harvard Law School, a 1957 lecture by Judge Learned Hand, published as THE
BILL OF RIGHTs 56-76 (1958), and a 1959 lecture by Columbia law professor Herbert
Wechsler, published as Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, supra note 150,
at 20-35.
178. Kurland, supra note 176, at 464. This critical theme appeared in several articles,
ranging from Jaffe, supra note 158, to Albert M. Sacks, Foreword to The Supreme Court,
1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 99 (1954) and Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H.
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
179. Kurland, supra note 176, at 465. Some commentators criticized the Court for
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Kurland also noted that in August 1958, the Conference of the
Chief Justices of the States had passed a resolution, by a 36-8 vote,
which concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States "has
tended to adopt the role of policy maker without judicial restraint,"
and urged the Court to "exercise ... the power of judicial self-
restraint by recognizing and giving effect to the difference between
that which ... the Constitution may prescribe and permit, and that
which ... a majority of the Supreme Court .. . may deem desirable or
undesirable." '  Commenting on the action by the Conference of
Chief Justices, Sanford Kadish found it an example of "recent attacks
on the Court" in which "the heroes have come to be identified as the
'judicial passivists'; the villains as the 'judicial activists.' "11' Kadish
stated that "recently ... these terms have superceded the old liberal-
conservative labels as the framework for debating Supreme Court
decisions." 82
Cumulatively, the process theorists had transformed the labels of
"activism" and "restraint" from synonyms for judicial liberalism and
conservatism to terms whose ideological content was to be
understood, at least facially, in a different way. When Albert Sacks
complained about the Court's performance in the 1953 Term, in
which Brown v. Board of Education'83 was decided, he said, of some
of the Court's more cryptic decisions, "the difficulty is not in the
result reached, but in the absence of explanations of what was
decided." '184  Repeatedly scholars such as Jaffe, Sacks, Brown,
Wellington, Hart, Wechsler, Bickel, and Kurland stated that they had
no particular quarrel with the substantive orientation of the Warren
Court; their concern was with its reasoning processes, which too often
suggested, as Kurland put it, "confusion of the judicial and legislative
increasingly using the certiorari power to summarily reverse the decisions of lower federal
courts without even hearing arguments. See Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law
to The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 77-82 (1958). Others went
further, suggesting that by taking too many cases and spending too little time on opinion-
writing, the Court produced opinions with "[t]echnical mistakes" that "lack the
underpinning of principle which is necessary to illumine large areas of the law..." Hart,
supra note 149, at 99-100.
180. Kurland, supra note 176, at 457. The resolution, which was accompanied by a
committee report on "Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions," was
passed on August 23, 1958. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution on Federal-State
Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions, Aug. 23, 1958, reproduced in U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. 92-102 (Oct. 3, 1958).
181. Sanford H. Kadish, A Note on Judicial Activism, 6 UTAH L. REV. 467, 467 (1959).
182. Id.
183. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184. Sacks, supra note 178, at 103.
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functions."1 85  Bickel and Wellington's 1957 critique of the Court
encapsulated the process theorists' perspective. "The Court's
product," they announced, "has shown an increasing incidence of the
sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results
accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum,
of opinions that do not opine." '186
The ideology of judicial restraint had become associated with
preserving the professional integrity of the judiciary. Taking fewer
cases, spending more time writing opinions, resisting invitations to
make "proclamations of doctrine irrelevant to the case, ' 187 waiting for
litigated issues to become fully ripe, and spelling out more clearly the
"bridge between the authorities ... and the results118 8 would allow
the Court, as Paul Freund put it, to "use the litigation process for the
refinement and adaptation" of durable legal principles.
189
By maintaining that there was a connection, especially in
constitutional law, between the production of technically competent
opinions and the professional stature and integrity of the judiciary,
process theorists had expanded the conception of judicial restraint to
include not simply avoiding the impulse to second-guess the
legislative branch on a matter of policy but, in addition, avoiding a
number of other pitfalls that awaited courts that too hastily set out to
promote substantive justice or a program of social reform. When one
argued for judicial restraint, therefore, it was not because one
opposed justice and reform. It was because one did not want the
Court's stature to suffer because it had too hastily ventured outside
its areas of competence, issuing broad pronouncements on matters of
public policy that it could not adequately connect to the actual cases it
was being asked to decide. In sum, process theorists could claim that
in advocating judicial restraint they were neither espousing liberalism
nor conservatism. They were merely seeking to preserve "public faith
in the objectivity and detachment of the Court, without which [it] will
be ... unable to perform those ... vital functions which properly fall
within its scope."190
185. Kurland, supra note 176, at 465.
186. Bickel & Wellington, supra note 178, at 3.
187. Kurland, supra note 176, at 465.
188. Bickel & Wellington, supra note 178, at 3.
189. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, 31 N.Y. STATE BAR BULL. 66, 78
(Feb. 1959).
190. Kurland, supra note 176, at 466.
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C. The Collapse of the Idea of the Center in Legal Scholarship in the
1950s and 1960s
Not all commentators in the 1950s and 1960s were enamored of
the process versions of judicial restraint. One former judge found
nonsensical the proposition that more collegial discussion, fewer
cases, and more time accorded to drafting opinions would produce
more reasoned decisions.19 Several scholars, responding to
Wechsler's insistence that the Court search for "neutral principles" of
constitutional law on which to base its decisions, doubted that
neutrality was an intelligible concept in constitutional adjudication'92
or argued that a judicial search for impersonal and durable principles
only served to deter judicial creativity and discourage courts from
doctrinal innovation. 93 Moreover, the occasional unreconstructed
behavioralist continued to maintain that judicial restraint did not
produce greater judicial objectivity or neutrality, since it was just as
capable of being employed in the service of results as any other
jurisprudential perspective.
19 4
Most of those critics of process theory versions of judicial
restraint approved of the Warren Court's solicitude for the
constitutional claims of disadvantaged minorities. But few used the
term "conservative" to describe advocates of judicial restraint or
"liberal" to describe their own positions.195  And no legal
commentator from the early 1950s through the early 1960s-the years
in which process versions of judicial restraint became dominant in law
journal literature-used the terms "center" or "centrist" to describe
191. Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1305-06
(1960).
192. See Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661,664 (1960); Addison Mueller & Murray L. Schwartz,
The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 UCLA L. REV. 571, 587-88 (1960).
193. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 3, 14-15 (1970); Charles E. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L.
REV. 660, 665 (1963) [hereinafter Clark, Unprincipled Decision]; Charles E. Clark, The
Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 AMER. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1963).
194. Fred Rodell, For Every Justice, Judicial Deference is a Sometime Thing, 50 GEO.
L.J. 700 (1962) [hereinafter Rodell, For Every Justice]; Fred Rodell, Judicial Activists,
Judicial Self-Deniers, Judicial Review and the First Amendment-Or, How to Hide the
Melody of What You Mean Behind the Words of What You Say, 47 GEO. L.J. 483 (1959).
195. One exception was Charles Clark, who said that the career of "the chief judicial
exponent of self-restraint," Frankfurter, "has fallen short of its earlier promise because he
has seemed not to press for the liberal point of view," and that the insistence of some
process theorists that constitutional decisions be grounded on "neutral principles"
eventually "re-enforceld] the dead hand of the law and the rule of the past." Clark,
Unprincipled Decision, supra note 193, at 661, 664.
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the position of Justices on the Court. Of the group of commentators
who surveyed the Court's performance in annual issues of the
Harvard Law Review from 1951 to 1962, the last even to apply the
term "bloc" to groups of Justices had been Louis Jaffe in 1951, and he
had been speaking of the Court in the 1940s. Not only had the
activism-restraint debate replaced "left" and "right" blocs as the axis
of commentary, the focus of discussions of the Court had shifted from
behaviorally oriented observations to the technical analyses of
professional lawyers. In this discourse of commentary, the idea of a
judicial center had no significance.
D. Judicial Behavioralism and the Idea of the Center in Political
Science Literature in the 1950s and 1960s
1. Scaling Analysis
In the same time period that process theory became the
dominant perspective of legal commentators on the Court, a line of
political science scholarship emerged whose focus on the internal
processes of governing institutions in a democratic society,
particularly legislatures, paralleled that of the process theorists.'
Alongside that line of commentary, however, emerged other political
science scholarship that continued to refine the behavioralist-inspired
techniques for investigating the Court that Pritchett had pioneered.
One group of behavioralist political science scholars developed a
technique called scaling, in which, as Glendon Schubert put it, judicial
ideologies could be "reconstruct[ed] ... from decisional behaviors." '197
Scaling analysis first identified, as Pritchett had, the policy
implications of cases decided by the Court. It then associated a
judge's votes for particular policy outcomes with "microattitudes,"
such as favoring "political freedom, fair procedure," and unions,
being "anti-business," or supporting "fiscal claims."' 98  It further
associated those microattitudes with "macroattitudes," such as
"political liberalism," "economic liberalism," "political
196. See sources cited in DUXBURY, supra note 30, at 242-51.
197. Glendon Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial, 29 J. POL. 3,
27 (1967) [hereinafter Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes]. That article represented a
summary of behavioralist work on judicial decisionmaking that Schubert had begun in the
1950s and refined throughout that decade and the 1960s. See Glendon Schubert, The
Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior," 52 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1007, 1014-17 (1958); see also GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 77-78
(1965) (defining scaling).
198. Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes, supra note 197, at 27.
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conservatism," and "economic conservatism.' 99  The result was a
scale on which all the Justices that served on the Court could be
ranked, and their ideologies labeled.2 "°
Glendon Schubert, in a 1967 article, produced a table
summarizing the rankings of Justices on "general scales of political
liberalism and of economic liberalism" between 1946 and 1963.21
The table suggested that six Justices who served on the Court during
that time period were both "political" and "economic" liberals, six
were "economic conservatives," and four were "political
conservatives. '"202 One Justice, Harold Burton, was simply labeled a
"conservative," because his political microattitudes (his response to
cases raising issues of political freedom and fair procedure) received
exactly the same weight on the scale as his economic microattitudes
(his response to cases involving unions, issues affecting the business
community, and fiscal claims).20 3 And one Justice, Byron White, was
labeled a "moderate" because the scaling of his attitudes resulted in
his being placed almost exactly at the mid-point of the "liberal"-
"conservative" scale.20"
Behavioral political science analysis of the performance of
Supreme Court Justices received some sharp criticism, in the decade
of the 1960s, from both legal scholars 205 and other political
199. Id. at 27-28.
200. Id. at 28.
201. Id.
202. Id. The political and economic liberals were Justices Murphy, Wiley Rutledge,
Douglas, Black, Earl Warren, and Wilson Brennan; the economic conservatives were
Justices Arthur Goldberg, Potter Stewart, Frankfurter, Jackson, Harlan, and Charles
Whittaker; the political conservatives were Justices Tom Clark, Vinson, Sherman Minton,
and Reed. Id.
203. Id.
204. Schubert ranked eighteen Justices. Murphy was ranked first on the scale of
political liberalism and first on the scale of economic liberalism. Reed was placed
eighteenth, on the political liberalism scale and Whittaker eighteenth on the economic
liberalism scale. White ranked eighth on the political liberalism and ninth on the
economic liberalism scale. Id.
When a Justice's rankings on political and economic liberalism diverged, Schubert
used the ranking closest to the ends of the scale to determine the Justice's ideological
label. Thus Goldberg, who was ranked seventh on political liberalism, was labeled an
"economic conservative" because Schubert's scale ranked him tenth on economic
liberalism. Vinson, who ranked seventh on economic liberalism, was labeled a "political
conservative" because he ranked sixteenth on political liberalism. Id.
205. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 34, at 1617 (concluding that "the choice of the
mathematical procedure to be followed" in any quantitative analysis of the work of
Supreme Court Justices "must rest ultimately on a quite unscientific conception of the
qualities of human motivation as it operates in judicial decisions").
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scientists.2 °6 One political science critic, in the course of claiming that
there was a "basic circularity in statistical approaches to the problem
of judicial attitudes" because "[c]onsistency in voting behavior is used
to infer the attitude, and then the attitude is used to explain the
consistency," found that scaling tended to distort the position of
Justices in "the middle" of the Court.207 "Even if the votes of the
middle Justices are consistent in terms of the scale," Martin Shapiro
argued, "their position in the middle indicates that they hold the
attitude measured by the scale less strongly than do the other
Justices."2  Thus, in close cases, "[t]hose Justices who actually
control the Court's decision are ... the least influenced by the
attitudes that the scaler is using to explain the behavior of the
Justices.
29
Shapiro's comments about "middle" Justices, and Glendon
Schubert's response to them, reveal that for all the efforts of
behavioralist scholars to associate the idea of a judicial center with
the location of a judge whose voting record, in cases with significant
policy dimensions, placed him roughly between blocs of Justices who
mainly supported "left" or "right" outcomes, commentators were
resisting a purely spatial understanding of "center." In the process of
reasserting that he only intended to employ "middle" or "moderate"
in a spatial sense, Schubert unwittingly revealed the difficulties in
doing so.
"In the first place," Schubert said of Shapiro's claim about
"middle" Justices, "ordinal positions on a scale ... are strictly relative
indices. '210 When he ranked Frankfurter on a "political liberalism"
scale between the 1947 and 1961 Terms, Frankfurter's ranking shifted
"from the fifth rank on the 1947 and 1948 ... scales, to third during
1949-54, and then to fourth in 1955, back to fifth in 1956-57 ... then
to seventh in 1958-60 [and to] eighth ... for the 1961 Term. '211 The
rankings, Schubert claimed, did not "indicate any change whatsoever
in his attitude toward political liberalism. 2 12 They only signified
Frankfurter's position with respect to the attitudes of the other
206. Two particularly strong criticisms of behavioralist approaches to judicial
decisionmaking were Walter Berns, Law and Behavioral Science, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185 (1963) and Wallace Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial
Process: A Critique, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593 (1963).
207. MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 14 (1964).
208. Id. at 37.
209. Id.
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Justices he sat with in a given year.
Thus "middle" was not intended to convey ideological
moderation in any universal sense. Nor was it intended to convey a
temperamental attitude. It was a mistake to think that if a Justice had
a moderate rank on scales, he must therefore have a moderate
intensity of preference for the views he held. A "scale rank,"
Schubert repeated, "is ... strictly a social index, a measure of how
one person relates to others.
'2 13
But Schubert had previously suggested that "[tihe justice in the
middle may be the central decisionmaker," and that "empirical
studies of political behavior show" that a person "in the middle" on
policy issues tended to be "the most-not the least-involved
member of the group, in regard to whatever the policy issue may
be." '214 Schubert even claimed that this high level of involvement on
the part of "middle" Justices affected a Justice's "belief system, as
well as ... his interactions with other members of the group." '215 The
"middle" position of a Justice, Schubert felt, encouraged his judicial
colleagues to "appeal for his support on an ideological level," so the
Justice was constantly being asked to examine and discuss his views.216
2. Scaling and the Idea of the Judicial Center
In his response to Shapiro, Schubert had claimed that the terms
"moderate," "middle," and "medial," which he used interchangeably,
only meant that although "moderate justices ... tend to be less
intense in their attitude ... than the more extreme justices at the
margins of the scale," this "lesser degree of intensity" was "a function
of [such Justices'] social position" in a group of Justices. 217 But he had
also argued that a "middle" Justice's "attitudinal position" was "the
most important one to the decisionmaking of the Court on the issue
under consideration, because his relatively moderate view will be
closest to the modal position for most decisions and opinions of the
Court on that issue. '218 The latter comments, coupled with Schubert's
earlier suggestion that "middle" Justices were perhaps more likely
than others to have highly developed belief systems because they
were frequently asked to support the views of their colleagues on
both ends of an ideological spectrum, revealed that when a Justice
213. Id. at 35.
214. Id. at 34.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 38.
218. Id. at 38-39.
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was designated as holding a "central" or "middle" position on a
Court, that designation necessarily had more than one set of
implications.
One set of implications recalled Pritchett's use of the terms
"center" and "central": "moderate" Justices, on Schubert's
scalograms, were Justices whose cumulative voting patterns, when
coded for certain policy variables, revealed them to be situated
roughly between Justices who were "liberals" and "conservatives."
Schubert insisted that this use of "moderate" or "middle" was relative
and term-specific, claiming that the fact that Frankfurter's rankings
on the political liberalism scale had changed over time did not mean
that his substantive views had changed.219 But Schubert's 1967 table
ranking Justices on general scales of political and economic liberalism
was an aggregate scale, and extended over seventeen years.
Moreover, some of the Justices ranked, such as Black, Douglas,
Frankfurter, Clark, and Reed, had served on the Court for all or most
of those years. In this context, the labeling of Black as a highly
ranked political and economic liberal, and of Reed as last among all
the Justices ranked on political liberalism, seemed to be more than
relative social indexes.
Thus, another implication of Schubert's characterization of
Justices as "moderate," or in the "middle" of the Court, was that the
labels signified that a Justice's stance toward policy issues was roughly
in the center of an ideological spectrum that had existed on the Court
for much of its recent history. That spectrum varied, at the margins,
with changes in Court personnel, and might also vary with Terms
because of the policy issues raised in cases decided in a given Term.
But over time, Schubert's scaling technique assumed, the spectrum
had enough consistency to allow Justices even to be ranked alongside
Justices with whom they had not served.22°  This meaning of
"moderate" or "middle," especially when those terms were used on
scales covering several years that made use of the labels "liberal" and
"conservative," did not seem to be primarily relative and contextual.
It seemed to signify a substantive policy vision roughly between
"liberalism" and "conservatism." And since Schubert's scaling
technique was dependent on substantive criteria (such as voting on
219. See id.
220. Murphy and Rutledge, who were ranked first and second on political liberalism
and first and fourth on economic liberalism by Schubert's scalogram covering the 1946
through the 1963 Terms, did not serve with the seven Justices with whom their attitudes
were compared (Warren, Brennan, White, Goldberg, Stewart, Harlan, and Whittaker).
Id. at 28.
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behalf of unions of in favor of "political freedom"), the judicial
ideologies he derived from votes and the attitudes he associated with
those votes were clearly meant to represent substantive policy
positions. Thus when a Justice was cumulatively ranked as a
"moderate" or in the "middle" of a spectrum of judicial liberals and
conservatives, that ranking had substantive dimensions.
The last set of implications followed from Schubert's claim that
"middle" Justices might well have strongly held policy views, and that
those views typically represented the "institutional attitude" of the
Court toward a particular issue."' This suggested that the "middle"
or "moderate" Justices on a given Court held considerable power.
Substantively, their views represented something like a midpoint on
the Court's ideological spectrum, so that, if one assumed a certain
fluidity in judicial views, more Justices might be inclined to
gravitate toward their positions. It also suggested that in closely
divided cases the "middle" Justices-now assuming the role of
"swing" Justices-might control the outcome of decisions. Being at
the judicial "center" of a Court, this conception of "middle" implied,
could mean being a very central figure in the development of that
Court's collective stance toward policy issues.
E. The Idea of the Judicial Center in the Late 1960s
By the close of the 1960s, the term "center" had been all but
abandoned in the two principal lines of scholarship analyzing the
performance of Supreme Court Justices. The emergence of
"activism" and "restraint" as the terms establishing the framework for
evaluations of the Court by legal scholars had complicated efforts to
attach ideological labels to the performance of Justices, and most
legal academics, while occasionally associating "liberalism" with
activism and "conservatism" with restraint, did not speak of "left"
and "right" blocs of Justices. In the most influential body of
scholarship that emerged in connection with the activism-restraint
debate, process jurisprudence, the term "center" was not employed at
all.
That development might have been expected because the general
thrust of process theory was to resist attaching labels derived from the
221. Id. at 39.
222. Political scientist J. Woodford Howard argued, in a 1968 essay prompted by the
emergence of behavioralist studies of the judiciary, that "fluidity of [judicial] choice is so
extensive in empirical reality as to pose very serious problems of classification and
inference" about judicial ideologies. J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of Judicial
Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43, 44 (1968).
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study of other branch actors to judges. But the term "center" also
dropped out of political science literature in the 1950s and 1960s. Not
only did Pritchett no longer employ the term in his 1953 study of the
Vinson Court, even though he continued to use voting alignment
analysis to characterize groups of Justices,223 the term was not, on the
whole, used by the behavioralist political science scholars who sought
to refine and extend Pritchett's techniques.224
Nonetheless, terms very like the term "center" played important
roles in the scaling techniques developed by Schubert and other
behavioralist political scientists in the 1950s and 1960s to characterize
the ideological positions of Justices and, hopefully, to predict their
responses to forthcoming cases. Schubert's term "middle" seemed
designed to replicate Pritchett's original use of "center" and
"central," and Schubert insisted that his term "moderate" amounted
to the same usage, namely a spatial location on an ideological
continuum of judicial attitudes in a given Term.225 But Schubert had
used "moderate" more ambitiously than that, as something
resembling a substantive set of attitudes, between liberalism and
conservatism, that could be charted over time. He had also
associated judicial "moderates," whose voting records placed them in
the "middle" of Courts, with a high degree of ideological awareness
and a considerable amount of internal power.226
In the 1970s the ideological implications of Schubert's "middle"
would help revive the idea of the judicial center. Schubert had
described "middle" Justices, in part, as ones whose stances toward
legal issues with discernible policy implications located them roughly
223. See, e.g., PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 56, at 177-84 (using voting
alignment tables).
224. Schubert, for instance, did not use such terms. Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes,
supra note 197. The term "center" occasionally cropped up in political science literature
in the 1960s. Howard referred to one 1958 study by Eloise Snyder that "hypothesized that
the high court assimilates its new members through a 'pivotal clique' in the ideological
center," and suggested that "newcomers" to the Court might feel pressure to "restrain
personal preferences and gravitate toward the center." Howard, supra note 222, at 45-46.
But Snyder did not actually use the term "center." She argued that the Court tended to be
divided between shifting cliques of Justices that were "read[y] to accept 'new'
constitutional interpretations," (she called those Justices "liberals") and cliques that were
"reluctan[t] to accept 'new' constitutional interpretations." ("conservatives"). Eloise
Snyder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 36 Soc. FORCES 232, 234 (1958). This
created opportunities for a shifting third clique, which she called "pivotal" because it
"reflected a middle point of view," and could thus align itself with one or the other of the
opposing cliques to "break [] ideological stalemate[s]." Id. at 238.
225. See Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes, supra note 197, at 34.
226. Id. at 34-35 (noting that the Justice "in the middle" may be the "central
decisionmaker").
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in the mid-point of an ideological continuum of Justices, and for that
reason were potentially powerful actors. Schubert had made these
observations at a time when even though commentators had
recognized groups of opposing Justices surfacing on the Vinson and
Warren Courts in the 1950s and 1960s, most commentators described
the lines of opposition as being produced, as Woodford Howard put it
in 1968, by "the ever-popular dichotomy between 'libertarian
activism' and 'judicial self-restraint.' "227
In the 1968 presidential election, however, Richard Nixon had
campaigned against Warren Court "activism," which he equated with
judicial support for substantively liberal policies, such as strong legal
protection for the rights of persons accused of crimes.228 After Nixon
assumed the presidency, he was given the opportunity to make four
appointments to the Court between 1969 and 1972. Many
commentators assumed that those appointments would result in the
Court's being closely divided between three holdover Warren Court
"liberals" (Douglas, Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall) and four
Nixon-designated "conservatives" (Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun,
Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist) in a manner resembling the
Court of the 1930s.229 This assumption implied that the positions of
"middle" Justices, Stewart and White, might be important in
determining the Court's ideological tilt. In addition, in roughly the
same time period, a term designed to convey the substantive
implications of a political stance occupying the midpoint of an
ideological spectrum had entered the lexicon of academic discourse.
That term was "centrist." The term would provide a mechanism for
commentators to revive the idea of a judicial center on the Supreme
Court.
III. THE IDEA OF THE JUDICIAL CENTER IN THE 1970s
We have seen that when activism and restraint emerged as the
dominant axes for evaluating judicial performance in the 1950s, two
background elements had been important in that development. One
element was the apparent support among almost all the "Roosevelt
Court" Justices for the substantive policies of the New Deal.
Commentators wondered why, given that support, nonunanimous
decisions and dissenting opinions actually increased on the Court in
227. Howard, supra note 222, at 55.
228. See JAMES SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD
NIXON'S AMERICA 276-77 (1973).
229. LEONARD LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 421, 432-36 (1974); SIMON, supra note 228, at 292-94.
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the 1940s. 23 ° The other was the fact that the divisions among Justices
in constitutional cases seemed to be most prominent in civil liberties
cases, in which legislative majorities were allegedly restricting the
constitutionally protected freedoms of unpopular minorities.231 Since
those cases were perceived as pitting New Deal liberals who believed
that the heart of democratic theory was majority rule against New
Deal liberals who believed that a democratic Constitution required
protection for the rights of all citizens, they appeared to pose
opposing theories of the Court's role in a democracy.
Those background elements of the activism-restraint debate
served to undermine the usefulness of talking about "left" ("liberal")
or "right" ("conservative") blocs on the Court. Not only were most
of the Justices liberals, they were falling out on issues that did not
lend themselves to predictably "liberal" or "conservative"
resolutions.232 The axes of activism and restraint seemed more
conducive to clarifying judicial positions on those issues. They made
explicable the increased divisions on the Court; and, process theorists
suggested, they went to the heart of judicial decisionmaking, because
they highlighted the reciprocal relationship between ends (results)
and means (reasoning) that all Supreme Court Justices had to
confront.233
Process theorists had not fully appreciated the connection
between an apparent disappearance of conventional ideological
divisions among Justices and the resonance of activism and restraint
as evaluative categories. When Nixon's 1968 campaign, and his
consequent opportunity to name four new Justices in a two-year
period, was taken to be an effort to politicize the Court, the idea of
ideological blocs among the Justices was revived.234  This Section
discusses the relationship between that development and the
emergence of newly dominant meanings for the term "center" in
constitutional commentary.
230. See supra notes 96-100,108 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
232. The most familiar examples involved the restriction of minority speakers, such as
Jehovah's Witnesses, by legislative majorities. The divisions on the Court precipitated by
compulsory flag salute legislation weave a particularly vivid illustration. See H.N. HIRSCH,
THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 171-76 (1981).
233. See supra Part IA-B.
234. For examples of the heightened attention paid to ideological "blocs" on the Court
in the early 1970s, see SIMON, supra note 228, at 18, 124, 288-94; LEVY, supra note 229, at
48.
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A. The Emergence of the Term "Centrist"
The term "centrist" was not unknown in legal and political
science literature prior to the 1970s, but it was used sparingly and did
not always connote an ideological stance. Most of the uses of
"centrist" referred to the Centrist party in Germany,235 and some
equated "centrist" with "central. ''236 It was not until the 1960s that
the term "centrist" began to be used in law journals to characterize a
perspective located midway between left or right on the political
spectrum. Thus Milton Handler, in a 1963 article on developments in
antitrust law, said that "[w]hile as a nation it is not uncommon for us
to swing from one extreme to another, our temper and tradition are
centrist and we generally end up in the middle of the road.
237
Chesterfield Oppenheim stated in 1965, in referring to the "shades of
thinking" among law students, that they might be labeled "liberal or
conservative or centrist., 238 And Peter Magrath, reviewing a book on
pornography in 1968, described its author as being "[t]rue to the
centrist position" by "cluck[ing] his tongue" at the "extreme
advocates of censorship" and the extreme defenders of pornographic
expression.239
Although those comments signified that the term "centrist" had
come to be associated with an ideological perspective, the term was
not commonly employed by scholars evaluating the work of the
Supreme Court until the 1970s. In the course of that decade,
however, "centrist" emerged as a frequent characterization of the
stance of Justices on the Burger Court. The increased use of the term
can be connected to two related phenomena. One, previously
mentioned, was the perception that the Court once again contained
"left" and "right" blocs of Justices in the original sense in which
235. E.g., Digest of Foreign Events, 67 U.S. L. REV. 337, 339 (1933) ("[M]ost ...
German industrial workers ... voted Socialist, Communist, or Centrist at the March
elections."). That specialized use of "centrist" appeared as early as 1890. See William A.
Dunning, Record of Political Events, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 357, 380 (1890) (noting that the
"Centrist" party had 107 members in the German Reichstag).
236. E.g., Eugene F. Mooney, The Media is the Message, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 388, 391
(1968) (suggesting that legal education might "make a serious institutional move to a more
centrist position in community decisionmaking" by adopting curricula that emphasized
"the processes of living in society" rather than the "half-conceptual, half-fortuitous ...
curricular framework... used today").
237. Milton Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 188
(1963).
238. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Looking Forward to the Second Decade, 8 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & ED. 201, 203 (1965).
239. C. Peter Magrath, Book Review, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 222 (1968).
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Pritchett had used those designations.2 40  The other was the 1975
appointment to the Court of Judge John Paul Stevens, who was
widely perceived on his confirmation as a Justice whose perspective
was neither predictably "liberal" nor "conservative." Stevens's
appointment, commentators suggested, might result in the balance of
power on the Court being located in a group of Justices who were not
consistently affiliated with the left or right blocs.24' Those Justices,
including Stevens, were labeled centrists.
Evidence of the first phenomenon can be seen in commentary on
the Court in the early 1970s, which posited the existence of "liberal"
and "conservative" groups of Justices on the Court and revived a
term long associated with behavioralist descriptions of Court
personnel, the "swing" Justice who alternated between left and right
perspectives.242 A 1975 article in the New York University Law
Review, which analyzed voting patterns on the Burger Court from the
1969 through the 1974 Terms,' felt that "the predictable voting
patterns of the 'left' and 'right' factions of the Court" made it suitable
for Pritchett's voting alignment analysis methodology.2" The article's
purpose was to show that "swing voting" on the Court was a
"myth" '245 because "voting blocs ... were remarkably strong" and
even "the voting patterns of those Justices who swung between the
ideological blocs" were generally consistent. 46  This reflected
common perceptions that with the Nixon appointees the Court had
240. See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
242. As early as 1936, journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen described Hughes
as having "swung back and forth from liberalism to economic stultification with greater
ease than the daring young man on the flying trapeze," and "[a]s chief justice ... [having]
run back and forth... frantically between the liberals on one side and the reactionaries on
the other." DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 75-76 (1936).
For illustrations of the revival of the term "swing justice" in the 1970s, see Philip
B. Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 181
(1972); Monrad S. Paulsen, Some Insights into the Burger Court, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 677
(1974). For journalistic commentary to the same effect, see Fred P. Graham, A Shift in the
Center of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1972, § 4, at 10; Lance Liebman, Swing Man on the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1972 (Magazine), at 16.
243. See William B. Schultz & Philip K. Howard, The Myth of Swing Voting: An
Analysis of Voting Patterns on the Supreme Court, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 798 (1975).
244. Id. at 798, 800-02. Given the continued dominance of the categories of activism
and restraint throughout the 1960s, it was suggestive that the article not only did not use
those categories in discussing judicial voting patterns, but the authors also announced that
they were "ignoring the nuances of judicial philosophy which may underlie several votes
for the same result." Id. at 800. Its emphasis was only on identifying voting blocs, groups
of Justices who "habitually... vote for the same result." Id. at 799 n.3.
245. Id. at 800.
246. Id. at 799.
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become deeply divided on ideological grounds, and that "the
cohesion of the Nixon appointees on the one hand and the three left-
bloc Justices [Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall] on the other was
remarkably firm." '247 The early Burger Court was said to be one
"consistently divided" between "[stable] voting lineups," '248 with
Powell and White not predictably affiliated with either bloc, but more
likely to side with the Nixon appointees in nonunanimous cases with
discernible policy implications.249
The perception that "left" and "right" blocs of Justices existed on
the early Burger Court did not itself encourage commentators to
consider the possible impact of "centrist" Justices, because the early
Burger Court was thought to be one in which the "conservative"
group of Nixon appointees could commonly pick up a fifth vote from
Stewart or White.20 But Stevens's appointment, plus some evidence
that the Nixon appointees were not as cohesive a group as once
thought, brought the label "centrist" into discussions of the Court.
In November 1975, Lesley Oelsner of the New York Times wrote
an article on the nomination of Stevens, who had previously served
five years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.251 In the first evaluative paragraph of the article, Oelsner said
that Stevens "is regarded as something of a centrist, neither extremely
conservative nor extremely liberal. '25 2  "Legal experts," Oelsner
suggested, thought it "likely that ... Stevens would take his place in
the middle area of the Court's Justices, with Potter Stewart, Byron R.
White, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. "253 The Burger Court, Oelsner felt,
"has had a more moderate tone than ... at the height of the Warren
247. Id. at 856.
248. Id. at 858.
249. Id. at 800. Schultz and Howard employed Pritchett's technique of deriving voting
blocs from surveying nonunanimous cases with discernible policy implications. They
created three categories of such cases: First Amendment cases (excluding cases involving
the religion clauses), id. at 823-32; "Criminal Law" cases, which included both
constitutional and nonconstitutional cases involving criminal defendants, id. at 832-46; and
"Cases Affecting Social Rights," which included "race cases, voting cases, cases involving
conflict between the individual and the 'system,' and those involving the rights of indigents
or the rights of individuals against business." Id. at 846-56. They claimed that their
tabulations of votes for the 1971, 1972, and 1973 Terms revealed "strict or partial bloc
voting" in nineteen of twenty-eight First Amendment cases, sixty-six of sixty-nine criminal
law cases, and thirty-one of forty-seven "social rights" cases. Id. at 823, 834, 846.
250. See SIMON, supra note 228, at 290 (identifying "the emerging conservative
majority" as "the four Nixon appointees plus Justices Stewart or White").
251. Lesley Oelsner, Ford Chooses A Chicagoan for Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES,





Court's activism," and Stevens's appointment "may help solidify the
current tenor of the Court. '254  Oelsner quoted Philip Kurland as
suggesting that Stevens would "fall in with" Powell, Stewart, and
White rather than Chief Justice Burger and Justices William H.
Rehnquist and Harry A. Blackmun, "on what is the more
conservative end" of the Court, or "Justices William J. Brennan, Jr.
and Thurgood Marshall on the liberal side.
255
Oelsner's article illustrated a slightly altered perception of the
Burger Court as well as a perception of Stevens as a "centrist." The
article identified Justice Lewis Powell as in the "middle" of the Court,
rather than as part of a "right" bloc of "Nixon appointees. 256  It
suggested that the Court's current "tenor" and "tone" was
"moderate. 257  Although it continued to list groups of Justices as
being on the "liberal" and "conservative" "ends" or "sides" of the
Court, it intimated that with Stevens's appointment the largest
number of Justices on the Court might not be easily identified as
"liberals" or "conservatives. ' 258  Although Oelsner did not state
explicitly that the Burger Court might now be controlled by judicial
centrists, that inference could have been drawn from his article.
By the time Stevens had been on the Court for two terms, several
commentators had concluded that he was a centrist, and that judicial
centrists appeared to be increasingly influential on the Burger Court.
An article surveying Stevens's Seventh Circuit opinions predicted that
"in the tradition of Mr. Justice Powell, [Stevens] will probably assume
a centrist position on the Court.1259 Another, also based on Stevens's
Seventh Circuit opinions and his testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee after being nominated, concluded that Stevens
"will in all likelihood be a centrist. '260  At the same time
commentators noticed that the Court itself might be exhibiting a
centrist posture. One article, focusing on antitrust decisions in the
1977 Term, declared that the "middle course" of Justice Stewart
"appeals to many of his brethren;" that "the absolutism of the Warren






259. Brandon Becker & Michael F. Walsh, Comment, The Interpenetration of Narrow
Construction and Policy: Mr. Justice Stevens' Circuit Opinions, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
899, 929 (1976).
260. Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Mr. Justice Stevens and the Burger Court's Uncertain
Trumpet, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 946, 951 (1976).
2005] 1139
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, along with Chief Justice
Burger, were sometimes part of a "fluctuating majority favoring a
temperate and balanced application of the antitrust laws." '261 The
position of the majority was "centrist." Another, in the course of
giving an "initial assessment" of Stevens's performance after two
years, described him as having "maintained a centrist position with a
marked degree of consistency" and predicted that his "independence
and political moderation" might make him "a unifying force" on the
Court .
2 6 2
1. The Burger Court as Centrist
By the late 1970s, an altered portrait of the Burger Court had
emerged. In a 1979 review of Bob Woodward's and Scott
Armstrong's The Brethren, which claimed to be an "inside" look at
the Supreme Court, Gene Nichol summarized that portrait. There
had been a "dramatic shift of power and philosophy" on the Court
"since the resignation of Earl Warren," Nichol wrote.263 In the
decade since Warren's departure:
[C]onsistent liberal majorities gradually gave way to more
moderate or conservative judicial approaches .... Nixon
appointees Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell and
William Rehnquist, as well as Gerald Ford's designee John Paul
Stevens, manage[d] to deflect the direction of the highest
tribunal away from the activist postures which characterized the
Warren years .... [But] the result is not a knee-jerk
conservative Court dominated by the Chief Justice. Rather, a
strong centrist core composed of Justices Stewart, Powell,
White and Stevens increasingly controls the outcome of cases.
Remaining liberals Brennan and Marshall appear to be left
isolated and embittered, no longer exercising substantial
influence over their colleagues. 4
Although Nichol found that The Brethren had "serious deficiencies,"
and exhibited "precious little understanding of the... institution with
which it deals," he called its overview of the orientation of the Burger
261. Milton Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrine, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979,
1027 (1977).
262. Branch Y. Ball & Thomas M. Uhlman, Justice John Paul Stevens: An Initial
Assessment, 1978 BYU L. REV. 567, 581.
263. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Book Review, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 299, 301 (1979) (reviewing





Court one of the book's "strong points. 265
The Brethren itself was filled with illustrations that a "centrist
core" of Justices controlled the Burger Court's direction. In one
example, Potter Stewart was reported to have been "dumbfounded,"
shortly after Lewis Powell joined the Court in 1971, when Powell told
him that he voted with Warren Burger in a case because he thought
he would "follow the leadership of the Court. 26 6 Stewart:
[diecided he had better explain to his new colleague something
about the realities of life at the Court. The leadership was not
Burger .... The leadership belonged to the Justices in the
center ... those who were neither doctrinaire liberals or
conservatives. It belonged to Stewart and White and Lewis
Powell if he chose.267
In another illustration, in the last paragraph of the book,
Woodward and Armstrong stated that the Burger Court's "turning
away from the Warren Court" in the late 1970s "was orchestrated and
controlled ... by Stewart,... White,... Powell, the most moderate of
the Nixon appointees, and by Stevens, the new moderate. ' ' 6
Although many commentators in the late 1970s shared Nichol's
view that The Brethren focused on "irrelevant trivialities" and
"gloss[ed] over problems of major significance to the Court as an
institution,"'269 they tended to accept the book's overall
characterization of the Burger Court as being dominated by
"centrist" Justices. Prior to the appearance of The Brethren, three
overviews of the Court had given very similar assessments. Richard
Funston's 1977 survey of voting patterns on the early years of the
Burger Court found that "[a]fter an interim period,... the Court...
settled into a trifurcated state" in which left and right "wings" were
joined by "an uncohesive center" occupied by Stewart, White, and
Powell.27 Elder Witt, in summarizing the 1977 Term, stated that
"[t]aken as a whole, the [Court's] decisions reflected a 'centrist'
court." ' And a general assessment of the Burger Court from the
265. Id.
266. BOB WOODWARD & Scort ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 256 (1979).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 444.
269. Nichol, supra note 263, at 303.
270. RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? THE
WARREN COURT AND THE BURGER COURT: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING IN MODERN
AMERICA 359 (1977).
271. Elder Witt, The Court's Year: Centrist, Shifting Alliances, C.Q. WKLY. REP., July
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1969 through the 1977 Terms concluded that "[t]here is no majority
which can be conceptualized simply along a liberal-conservative
spectrum"; instead there was "an amorphous group of centrist
Justices," which did not include Burger.2 72 By 1977, the number of
those Justices had grown to a "floating quintet," consisted of
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Stewart, and White, whose "center of
gravity lay somewhat nearer to Burger than to Brennan. 2 73 If the
"Nixon quartet of Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist" had
ever been "a crucial voting bloc," it was for a "brief period," ending
by the 1974 Term.
2 74
Although the increased frequency of such comments meant that
a portrait of the Burger Court as centrist was well established by the
close of the 1970s, the concept of the judicial center had still not been
defined with precision. The initial meaning of "centrist" in
commentary on the Burger Court had been that of a judicial posture
that was neither "liberal" in the sense used to characterize late
Warren Court majorities nor "conservative" in the sense used to
characterize the Nixon appointees in the early 1970s. Since that use
of "liberal" and "conservative" echoed Pritchett's use, referring to
cumulative voting positions in cases with discernible policy
outcomes, 275 "centrist" seemed only to refer to a middle-of-the-road
voting stance.
But as the number of Burger Court Justices identified as
"centrists" grew, the term also came to take on spatial dimensions. It
began to be used by some commentators to describe an apparently
pivotal space between the Court's "left" and "right" wings where the
power on the Court resided.276
This use of "centrist" was employed by the authors of The
Brethren when they asserted that in the late 1970s "the center was in
control" of the Burger Court.277 They meant that a group of Justices,
ranging from four to five, was not identified, philosophically, with the
two "clear minority pairings" on the left and right of the Court, and
that the group, because of their numbers, could not only control
outcomes, but could exert some influence on the shape of the Court's
22, 1978, at 1847.




275. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Hodder-Williams, supra note 272, at 191.




The situation was complicated further by the fact that as an
image of the Burger Court as centrist emerged, little attention was
devoted to the jurisprudential connotations of centrism, as
distinguished from its political or spatial connotations. This
development might at first glance appear puzzling. Commentary on
the Court from both legal scholars and political scientists, for the
previous two decades, had increasingly analyzed the Court's
decisions, and internal divisions, along the axes of judicial activism
and restraint rather than along those of left or right, liberal or
conservative. 279 And as the activism-restraint debate, with its process
theory refinements, came to dominate commentary in those decades,
the idea of the judicial center played a reduced role in
characterizations of the Court or its Justices, even among
behavioralist political scientists who continued to employ forms of
voting alignment analysis. Why, then, when the term "centrist"
emerged as a common term in Supreme Court commentary, was there
so little effort on the part of commentators to chart a centrist
jurisprudential posture along the axes of the activism-restraint
debate?
Of the commentators who employed the term "centrist" to
describe the Burger Court and its Justices, only three made an effort
to describe a centrist posture, either in a Justice or in the Court
generally, as reflecting a theory of the judicial function. In his 1976
assessment of Justice Stevens, Francis Beytagh concluded that
Stevens revealed "a pronounced streak of Frankfurterianism
tempered by a willingness to apply the law vigorously in those areas
... where the fundamental nature of the rights at stake outweigh
considerations of judicial self-restraint.""28 That comment suggested
that in labeling Stevens a "centrist," Beytagh meant a judge whose
posture alternated between activism and deference. Similarly, in a
1979 article on Potter Stewart's posture in racial discrimination cases,
Gayle Binion described Stewart's "approach to constitutional
adjudication" as exhibiting a "tendency to narrow the issue, decision,
and remedy," which Binion associated with "restraint in
constitutional decision-making."281 Binion felt that Stewart's
278. Id.
279. See supra notes 107-47 and accompanying text.
280. Beytagh, supra note 260, at 946.
281. Gayle Binion, Justice Potter Stewart on Racial Equality: What it Means to be a
Moderate, 6 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 853, 856, 904-05 (1979).
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"moderate approach" reflected a "centrist theoretical orientation.""28
Beytagh's and Binion's descriptions of centrism as a theory of the
judicial function were not identical. Beytagh characterized judicial
centrists as those who selectively departed from a deferential posture
when "fundamental rights" were "at stake, 2 3 and Binion described
them as minimalists who eschewed the formulation of broad
constitutional principles.2" The only extended discussion in the 1970s
of jurisprudential centrism on the Burger Court suggested that it
might include both of those attitudes. In his 1979 overview, Hodder-
Williams began by noting that Nixon's "major consideration in
selecting his nominees was that they should be 'strict constructionists'
and not 'activists.' "285 If one assumed that the late Warren Court had
a majority of "activists," and that "all of Nixon's appointees were
['strict constructionists']," Hodder-Williams claimed, "we would
expect a radical alteration to the philosophical balance of the
Court.
2 86
But there were some obstacles, Hodder-Williams felt, in the way
of a conclusion that the Warren and Burger Courts could be
contrasted along the lines of "activism" and "strict construction.
2 87
Both terms embraced multiple judicial postures, so that a contrast
between them needed to address each of the postures. One was how
"eager" a judge was to "extend the reach of judicial power. "288
Another was whether a judge "preferr[ed] his own vision of desirable
policy to the legislation of elected assemblies. 2 89  A third was
whether a judge was inclined to "read[] ... his personal views into...
the Constitution." '29  Hodder-Williams thought that a way to
disentangle those postures was to ask a series of specific questions
about the Burger Court's "activism. '29 1 Had it "limited access to the
Court and so cut down on the issues to be decided? ' '21 Had it
"assumed the constitutionality of congressional legislation" and
"tended to defer to the executive branch? ' 293 And had it "created
282. Id. at 905.
283. See Beytagh, supra note 260, at 946.
284. See Binion, supra note 281, at 904.
285. See Hodder-Williams, supra note 272, at 174-75.









new rights and new absolutes from the sparse words of the
Constitution?"
294
When these specific questions were asked, a somewhat
counterintuitive picture emerged. On the one hand, the Court had
"attempted to limit its power by curbing access to it."295 But Hodder-
Williams suggested that this "self-restraint" could be seen as "a
conscious means of advancing preferred ends," in particular "the
administrative necessity of reducing the flow of litigation reaching the
Court. '296  And in other respects the Burger Court majorities
appeared to have embraced activism. The Court had invalidated
provisions of twenty-seven Acts of Congress in its first seven years,
whereas only seventy-seven had been invalidated between 1789 and
1937.297 It had also regularly found acts of the executive branch
unconstitutional.298 It had followed the Warren Court in "enlarging
the rights which now, as a result of judicial action, are said to flow
from the Constitution itself. '299 Sex discrimination, abortion, and
death penalty decisions were the most visible examples.3°° In general,
Hodder-Williams found that "the Burger Court has not been afraid to
exercise its judicial muscle, to thwart the Executive, to countermand
the laws of duly elected legislators, to draw from the sparse words of
the Constitution new rights and new duties."301
There were, however, occasional instances, Hodder-Williams
believed, in which the Court, in addition to limiting the access of
litigants to it, had "sought ... to avoid decisions where they could be
avoided, ... to decide on narrow grounds where that is practicable
and to evade the creation of new principles if at all possible. '3 °" On
the whole, the Burger Court had "stood firmly behind ... Warren
precedents,"3 3 but although some majorities were "ready to use
[judicial] power with energy and conviction," other majorities "often
abjure[d] the use" of that power.3" In the end, the Burger Court
seemed more activist than restrained, but it also seemed "to be in a
constitutional quandary, unsure how to balance conflicting
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 176.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 176-77.
299. Id. at 178.
300. Id. at 179-80.
301. Id. at 186.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 180.
304. Id. at 181.
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constitutional claims and lacking a coherent philosophy. 30 5
Although Hodder-Williams had devoted attention to the issues
of activism and restraint, he had not produced much evidence that
Justices on the Burger Court were interested in the sorts of issues
process theorists had thought central to developing a refined theory
of the judicial function. Nor had he devoted much attention to those
issues. His fullest statement of a theory that might be animating
"ft]he Justices whose votes are critical in divided cases," the "floating
center" of the Burger Court, came in this paragraph:
[Those Justices] have increasingly come to share a common
approach, though not common values.... They respond to
cases with the conscious restraint of Justices seeking to avoid
the enunciation of broad principles.... [T]o characterize their
approach ... as "ad-hoccery" ... emphasizes a tendency to
employ a case-by-case approach to many of the conflicts
brought to the Court. These conflicts are frequently extremely
complex and ambiguous and the critical Justices respond to this
complexity by acknowledging it.3" 6
The paragraph suggested that centrist Burger Court Justices
were avoiding the "enunciation of broad principles" primarily
because they perceived that the constitutional issues before them
were "extremely complex and ambiguous," and caution was
necessary.3 7 That stance could hardly be described as a sophisticated
jurisprudential position.
IV. THE 1980S: THE IDEA OF A JUDICIAL CENTER EXPANDS
Hodder-Williams's 1979 survey of the Burger Court illustrated
the common terms in which it would be understood for the remainder
of Burger's tenure, which ended in 1986. Even though several
commentators began to believe, in the later stages of Burger's Chief
Justiceship, that the Court might once again be poised to institute
sweeping changes in constitutional jurisprudence, a general
impression that a floating majority of centrists dominated the Court
remained in place. And although the idea of a judicial center on the
Burger Court began to take on overtones of jurisprudential as well as
political or spatial centrism, it was not associated with the activist-
restraint debate.
305. Id. at 186.




Two essays in a collection on the Burger Court that appeared in
1983 illustrated the established formulation of the idea of the judicial
center in the 1980s and early 1990s. One described the Court as a
collection of "rootless," centrist activists,38 and the other sought to
explain why debates about the Court's constitutional jurisprudence
no longer pivoted on the axes of the activism-restraint debate. 0 9
A. Centrism and Activism
The essays had been written in a period in which the two most
visible theoretical perspectives in the literature of constitutional
commentary had been advanced by heirs of process theory. The work
of Ronald Dworkin and John Hart Ely in the late 1960s and early
1970s revealed that both had been influenced by the institutional and
doctrinal orientation of process theorists, particularly their emphasis
on the issue of how judges could derive appropriately general and
durable constitutional principles that justified their supplanting the
popularly elected branches as policymakers.3 ° But although that
scholarship had been within the parameters of process jurisprudence,
by the late 1970s Dworkin and Ely were moving outside those
parameters. In two influential books, which appeared in 1977 and
1980, Dworkin and Ely argued that the values of equality (signified by
the principle of equal concern and respect) and unrestricted political
participation (signified by the principle that all members of society
should be represented in democratic institutions of governance) were
sufficiently foundational to serve as organizing premises for judges
deciding constitutional cases.31'
For present purposes, the significance of those works by
Dworkin and Ely is that their visibility revealed that by the early
1980s American constitutional theorists were increasingly inclined to
believe that at bottom, constitutional adjudication was about value
choices.312 Process theory had assumed that judicial value choices
308. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
309. See Martin Shapiro, Father and Sons: The Court, The Commentators, and the
Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
218 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
310. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) (noting
the impact of process on judicial decisionmaking); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (describing the Court as
second-guessing the legislative branch in Roe v. Wade).
311. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); JOHN FIART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
312. This statement might not seem accurate with respect to Ely, who denied in
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could be confined if judges were encouraged to give sufficient
attention to the doctrinal and institutional constraints on their
decisions that modern democratic theory demanded." 3 If Supreme
Court Justices derived appropriately general and durable
constitutional principles on which to ground their decisions, and
avoided substituting their judgments for those of other branch actors
if such principles could not be derived, their (limited) role as
policymakers could be preserved. Dworkin and Ely probed this
assumption, and concluded that behind a perceived judicial obligation
to derive durable constitutional principles lay a judgment about which
foundational values made those principles durable, and behind a
judicial decision to defer or not defer to other branch actors lay a
judgment about what values democratic government had identified as
foundational.314 The attraction of Dworkin's and Ely's theories to
their contemporaries in the 1980s lay in their insistence that judicial
fidelity or indifference to the traditional institutional and doctrinal
constraints of process theory was a choice about values.315
We have seen that a version of this argument had been advanced
by defenders of the Warren Court against their process-inspired
critics.3 16  Dworkin's and Ely's versions of value-oriented
constitutional theory made an effort to refine and develop the
argument by positing that the principles of equal concern or respect,
or participation in democratic governance, had been built into the
structure of American constitutionalism and could thus be seen,
despite their substantive character, as something approaching
foundational constraints on judges.317  Both Dworkin and Ely
acknowledged their indebtedness to process theorists3 18  but the
impact of their work was to move constitutional commentary away
Democracy and Distrust that "fundamental values" could serve as a basis for aggressive
judicial review of legislation on constitutional grounds, and who also suggested that
"participation" should be understood as a procedural rather than a substantive value. See
ELY, supra note 311, at 44-72, 75. But in the very portion of Democracy and Distrust in
which he claimed that "participational values" were procedural rather than substantive,
Ely defended that claim by stating that "participational values [were] the values which our
Constitution has preeminently and most successfully concerned itself," and "whose
'imposition' ... supports the American system of representative democracy." Id. at 75.
Participation was, in short, a fundamental constitutional value. For more detail, see
White, The Arrival of History, supra note 27, at 554-58.
313. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
314. See DWORKIN, supra note 311 passim; ELY, supra note 311 passim.
315. See DWORKIN, supra note 311 passim; ELY, supra note 311 passim.
316. See supra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
317. DWORKIN, supra note 311 passim; ELY, supra note 311 passim.
318. See DWORKIN, supra note 311, at 4 (Hart & Sachs), 162 (Wechsler), 144 (Bickel);
ELY, supra note 311, at 37-38 (Wellington), 69-70 (Bickel), 54-55 (Wechsler).
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from the concerns of the activism-restraint debate. Since, as Dworkin
and Ely suggested, a substantive prioritizing of values affected-and
should affect-the way in which judges responded to the doctrinal
and institutional dimensions of their decisions, all Justices could be
seen as activists.319 Even when the Court decided that doctrinal or
institutional reasons precluded it from exerting supervisory authority
over the other branches on a matter of policy, that decision
represented a calculus about values.
1. Centrist Activism on the Burger Court
The prominence of Dworkin's and Ely's work in the 1980s can
serve as a backdrop for the two essays on the Burger Court previously
identified.32 ° Vincent Blasi set out, in his essay, to demonstrate that
"[b]y virtually every meaningful measure ... the Burger Court has
been an activist court,"32' and that its "activism ... has been
generated as well as moderated by the pragmatic men of the
center." '322 As he put it in summary:
[The Burger Court's] activism has been inspired not by a
commitment to fundamental constitutional principles or noble
political ideals, but rather by the belief that modest injections of
logic and compassion by disinterested, sensible judges can serve
as a counterforce to some of the excesses and irrationalities of
contemporary governmental decision-making. In other words,
in the hands of the Burger Court judicial activism has become a
centrist philosophy-dominant, transcending most ideological
divisions, but essentially pragmatic in nature, lacking a central
theme or an agenda.323
Blasi began his discussion of activism on the Burger Court by
stating that "the activist-restraintist division" among judges and
commentators "has been at the heart of constitutional discourse for at
least the last fifty years:' 324 But he also suggested that "the 1970s and
early 1980s may well be looked upon as the period during which the
activist approach to judicial review solidified its position in American
judicial practice." '325 He noted that although the Burger Court's
319. DWORKIN, supra note 311 passim; ELY, supra note 311 passim.
320. Blasi, supra note 308; Shapiro, supra note 309.
321. Blasi, supra note 308, at 208.
322. Id. at 211.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 198.
325. Id.
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opinions "of the last thirteen years abound with essays on the virtues
of judicial self-restraint,"326 the practice, however, was different. The
Burger Court had left intact "the great activist trilogy of the Warren
years," decisions governing school desegregation, reapportionment,
and the interrogation of criminal suspects.32 It had been no less
willing than the Warren Court to invalidate acts of Congress.32 8 It had
been equally willing to "step into the breach of a constitutional
crisis," as in its expedited review of President Nixon's claims of
executive privilege in the Watergate tapes controversy.329 It had been
''a more active umpire of the federal system" than the Warren
Court.33° And even in "its interpretation of the technical doctrines
and statutes that demarcate the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 33'
where commentators predicted that it would severely cut back on
litigant access, the actual record was more mixed.
332
Blasi concluded that the Burger Court's opinions "lack[ed] a
central theme or an agenda," being doctrinally or theoretically
"rootless." '333 And the postures he associated with the Burger Court's
rootless activism were also those he associated with its centrism. The
centrist activists on the Court had "no deep-seated vision" of the
Constitution or specific provisions.334 They were attracted to the
"line-drawing aspect[s] of the process of doctrinal formation.
335
They thought of the resolution of constitutional controversies as
"practical compromises" rather than opportunities to exert "moral
force," or to articulate "aspirations," or "ideals." '336 They had "an
addiction to ... middle-of-the-road doctrines ' 37 and a "powerful
aversion to making fundamental value choices.
338
Blasi's essay disengaged centrism from the activism-restraint
debate, but at the same time suggested that it might have a
jurisprudential as well as a spatial identity. Centrism still meant a
spatial location: between "liberal" and "conservative" ideological
326. Id. at 199.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 200.
329. Id. at 201.
330. Id. at 203.
331. Id. at 196.
332. Id. at 206-08.
333. Id. at 211.
334. Id. at 212.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 214.
338. Id. at 216.
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"extremes." '339 But unlike the traditional function of Justices at the
"center" of a Court, to "moderate but ... not generate the growth of
constitutional principles," the Justices who dominated the Burger
Court had transformed judicial activism into a "centrist
philosophy.""34  That philosophy, as Blasi understood it, was not
simply the equivalent of political moderation. It was a deliberate
attempt to avoid the full-scale resolution of conflicts between values.
It reflected "a notable determination to fashion tenuous doctrines
that offer both sides of a social controversy something important.
3 41
It sought to match up a moderate political stance to doctrinal caution,
emphasizing "[a]d hoc accommodations" and "short-term ...
solutions" to the contested issues of policy that emerged in the form
of visible Supreme Court cases.342
2. Centrist Activism and Commentary
Looking at the Burger Court from another perspective, that of
"fashions in constitutional commentary," Martin Shapiro came to a
similar conclusion.343  But his interest was not so much in
demonstrating that the activism-restraint debate no longer seemed
resonant for the centrist Justices on the Court as in showing that it no
longer seemed resonant for the legal academics who studied their
decisions. Shapiro began by noting that "the generation of
commentators" that dominated academic discourse between 1950 and
1970 had written "endlessly about judicial self-restraint," even after
"the Warren Court had rendered the debate obsolescent by firmly
choosing the path of activism."3" Shapiro's explanation for the
preoccupation of those commentators with the activism-restraint
debate was that they were principally interested in "the vindication of
the New Deal," and were thus torn between their appreciation that
the Warren Court "was engaged in a ... comprehensive
constitutionalization of the New Deal's fundamental vision of social
justice," and their recognition that it was also, in its aggressive
scrutiny of other branch actors, "violating [the New Deal's]
fundamental political theory of the strong presidency." '345
Commentators in the 1950s and 1960s "loved what the Court was
339. Id. at 211.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 216.
342. Id. at 216-17.
343. Shapiro, supra note 309, at 218.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 218-19.
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doing but hated the fact that it was doing it."'346
Having described constitutional commentary in the 1950s and
1960s as centered on the activism-restraint debate, Shapiro then
claimed that by the early 1980s "[all these New Deal tactical
disagreements now seem old hat. 3 47  His explanation for the
apparent irrelevance of the debate was the appearance of "a new
generation of Court commentators" whose "consciousness-shaping
crisis was not 1937" but the crisis that led to Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954.348 Those commentators now regarded the "central
problem" of constitutional jurisprudence as "not whether the Court
can or should act, but how it ought to act. '349 They were "developing
a jurisprudence of values rather than institutional roles. '35 ° They had
coalesced around "a happy acceptance of the judicial activism that so
troubled their immediate forbearers, ' 351 and were engaged in an
effort to use "the Judeo-Christian tradition, historical experience,
personal conviction, social democratic political and economic theory,
and ethical derivations from modern biology [and] linguistics" to
"posit certain values as ultimate or at least 'higher.' "352
The Burger Court, Shapiro believed, was also preoccupied with
values: its leading constitutional decisions could be seen as efforts to
avoid making definitive value choices on deeply contested social
issues. Shapiro argued that "conflicts between individual autonomy
and social justice that were suppressed in the Warren period 35 3 had
emerged during Burger's tenure, so that not only the Court, but
American society at large, was having difficulty deciding how to
respond to situations-affirmative action being only one example-in
346. Id. at 219.
347. Id. at 220.
348. Id. at 220 n.6.
349. Id. at 220.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 224. Shapiro included Dworkin and Ely among his "new generation of
Court commentators." He was somewhat pressed to make Ely, whom he acknowledged to
have "reject[ed] ethical positivism of the sort I have attributed to others of his
generation," a value-oriented theorist. Id. at 223-24. But he insisted that Ely's focus on
the value of participation, as implemented in "the representation-reinforcement doctrine,"
amounted to a substantive commitment to the value of equality. "[A]lmost all of the real
cases that the rest of the new generation of commentators can approve on equality
grounds," Shapiro claimed, "also will yield approval under the representation reinforcing
formula." Id. at 223.
Shapiro had an easier time with Dworkin, characterizing him, accurately, as
"attempting to demonstrate that equality ought to be the central principle from which
constitutional and other legal rules are to be deduced." Id. at 224.
353. Id. at 228.
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which "inequalities [were] visited by government action upon some
individuals now in the hope that such visitations [would] result in
equality for all later. 354 Shapiro felt that conflicts between the values
of autonomy and equality had resulted in the Burger Court having
three imperfect choices: "compensating the underdog until equality is
reached," "emphasiz[ing] the value of autonomy against the
competing winds of equality," or "simply plung[ing] into the ad hoc
wars of day-to-day elite politics." '355 The third choice, which for
Shapiro characterized the Burger Court's jurisprudential stance, was
precisely the posture Blasi had associated with the centrist activists on
that Court.
3. Implications
The Blasi and Shapiro essays, written at a moment when the
identity of the Burger Court and the jurisprudential climate in which
it operated seemed finally to have become clear to commentators,
would have far-reaching implications. Three of those implications
were particularly important.
First, Blasi's portrait of the Burger Court as being dominated by
centrist activists was the dominant perception of the Court into the
1990s, even after Rehnquist replaced Burger as Chief Justice and the
Court was seen by several commentators as more inclined to lean
rightwards.356 The dominance of that image of the Court had two
principal consequences. It gave the label centrist a scope and a
resonance it had not previously had in commentary on the Court.
Centrist Justices were not simply Justices located at the Court's
center: they had a distinctive political and jurisprudential philosophy.
The escalation of the label's significance greatly expanded the
salience of the idea of the judicial center.
The image of the Burger Court as being dominated by centrist
activists also reconfigured the jurisprudential setting in which
commentary on the Court took place. No longer did that
commentary focus on the activism-restraint debate. Blasi gave lip
service to that debate, but then devoted his essay to demonstrating
that the Court was now a collection of activists." 7 Shapiro claimed
that the current generation of scholars devoted to commenting on the
Court had little interest in the debate. 8  Their jurisprudential
354. Id. at 234-35.
355. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
356. See infra note 371-72 and accompanying text.
357. See Blasi, supra note 308, at 198.
358. See Shapiro, supra note 309, at 218-20.
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philosophies were value-oriented versions of activism. Their posture
toward the Court, while often critical, did not chastise the Court for
insufficient deference to doctrinal or institutional imperatives. They
criticized the Court for making the wrong value choices or avoiding
making them altogether. 9
The collapse of the activism-restraint debate as a fulcrum for
constitutional commentary was eventually to have the effect of
accentuating the jurisprudential as well as the political implications of
a centrist judicial posture. Blasi had described the jurisprudential
basis of Burger Court majority decisions as rootless and emphasized
the ad hoc quality of many majority opinions.36° In stressing the
disinclination of Burger Court majorities to make fundamental value
choices, he intended to contrast the Burger Court unfavorably with
the late Warren Court."' Shapiro's essay, however, suggested that
the centrist majorities' posture might not be a product of timidity or
the absence of a thematic vision. He thought that a deliberate judicial
choice not to engage in substantive value prioritizing-to decline, for
example, to make a full-scale commitment to equality as a
constitutional imperative-might signal a tacit recognition that
constitutional values once thought as mutually reinforcing, such as
equality and freedom, could actually collide across a range of cases,
leading to a reconsideration of the New Dealers' assumption that all
social problems could be solved by government. 62
Shapiro's association of the Burger Court's ad hoc pattern of
decisions with growing cultural conflicts between the constitutional
values of equality and autonomy implied that centrist judging might
not merely be the tentative groupings of Justices forced to make
difficult value choices. It might also reflect a judicial belief that the
Court would expose itself as having transgressed the limits of its
authority if it attempted a full-scale substantive prioritization of
constitutional values every time they conflicted. Centrist decisions,
from this perspective, could be seen as versions of judicial self-
restraint. They could also be seen as conscious efforts on the part of
some Justices to stake out a position between the extremes of the
"culture wars" that began to surface in the 1980s.
In that decade, Americans seemed, for the first time since the
New Deal, deeply divided about the proper relationship between
citizens and the government. Shapiro had forecast that division,
359. See Blasi, supra note 308, at 46; Shapiro, supra note 309, at 220-21.
360. See Blasi, supra note 308, at 216-17.
361. See id. at 211-12.
362. See Shapiro, supra note 309, at 228-29.
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noting the radical opposition between a perspective that the
government should compensate social, political, and economic
underdogs until true equality was reached and a perspective that
combined, in a "conservative political philosophy," a commitment to
the autonomy and privacy dimensions of individual freedom with
aggressive definitions of the constitutional principles of separation of
powers and federalism.363 Those perspectives were in fundamental
disagreement, Shapiro believed, not only about whether equality or
autonomy should be the transcendent constitutional values, but, more
fundamentally, about whether government should take care of
individual citizens or leave them alone.3" Judicial centrism could thus
be seen as a response to the culture wars of the late twentieth century.
This understanding of centrism was to linger over the next two
decades. The intuition that centrism might have jurisprudential as
well as political and spatial dimensions produced the multifaceted
characterization of the idea of a judicial center reflected in the
Greenhouse essay with which this Article began.365 The term
"center" or "centrist" began to be understood as a label with multiple
connotations, potentially identifying the political and the
jurisprudential philosophies of Justices as well as identifying their
spatial location on a Court. It also began to be understood as an
important reference point for thinking about the Rehnquist as well as
the Burger Courts against the backdrop of deep divisions in late
twentieth century political culture. With this development, the idea
of the judicial center became an integral part of commentary on the
Supreme Court of the United States.
V. THE IDEA OF THE CENTER ON THE REHNQUIST COURT
Although the idea of the judicial center had been a feature of
commentary on the Supreme Court since the 1940s, and had begun to
assume a prominent role in that commentary in the 1980s, it was not
until the mid-1990s that a series of factors combined to establish the
idea as a commonplace element in the writings of legal scholars,
political scientists, and journalists on the Rehnquist Court. This
Section identifies those factors and describes their cumulative
elevation of the idea to a conspicuous place in the lexicon of Supreme
Court commentary.
For most of the 1980s, the portrait of the Court sketched by Blasi
363. Id. at 228.
364. Id.
365. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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and the description of commentary advanced by Shapiro were treated
as conventional wisdom in many places. Reviews on the book in
which Blasi's and Shapiro's essays appeared,366 Studies of individual
Justices on the Court,3 67 and overviews of the Burger Court by legal
scholars,3 6 political scientists,369 and journalists30  referred to the
366. See, e.g., Paul Bender, Is The Burger Court Really Like The Warren Court?, 82
MICH. L. REV. 635, 652 (1984) (stating that "activism versus restraint is, for now at least, a
dead issue"); Joel B. Grossman, The 'Roots' of Rootless Activism, 1985 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 147, 149 (1985) (book review) (acknowledging the "centrism" of the Burger Court,
although suggesting that it mainly stemmed from "the lack of a clear vision of how the
conservative retrenchment should be carried out"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of
Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. REV. 315, 317 (1984) (book review) (endorsing Blasi's view
that "judicial activism has become a centrist philosophy" on the Burger Court).
367. E.g., Pierce O'Donnell, Justice Byron R. White: Leading From the Center, 72
A.B.A. J. 24 (1986); Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11
HAMLINE L. REV. 183 (1988). The importance of "centrist" as an evocative label for the
members of the Burger Court can also be seen in articles that disagreed with the
application of the label to particular Justices. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, The Powell-Stevens
Debates on Federalism and Separation of Powers, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 549, 584
(1988) (applying voting alignment analysis to characterize Powell and Stevens as "fixed at
opposite ends" of a debate on structure-of-government issues).
368. E.g., Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Burger Court (1969-1986), 27 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 31 (1987). My own essay on the Burger Court in the 1988 edition of The
American Judicial Tradition referred to "the pragmatic, ad hoc character of its
constitutional jurisprudence," stated that after 1975 the Court was "dominated by a
shifting majority of centrists who preferred, for the most part, narrow and cautious
dispositions of issues," quoted Blasi's characterization of the Court as having "a powerful
aversion to making fundamental value choices," and suggested that that stance amounted
to an implicit recognition of the culturally "divisive" character of the issues the Court
confronted. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 148, at 423-24,
431,456-57.
369. E.g., Henry J. Abraham, Freedom and the Constitution: A Second Century
Appraisal, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 847 (1987); Robert L. Dudley & Craig R. Ducat, The
Burger Court and Economic Liberalism, 39 W. POL. Q. 237 (1986); David M. O'Brien, The
Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to Rehnquist, 20 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 12 (1987).
The Abraham and O'Brien essays made some effort to identify centrism within the terms
of the activism-restraint debate, Abraham suggesting that centrism was a response to the
"elusive line" between activism and restraint, Abraham, supra, at 866, and O'Brien stating
that "[i]n the final analysis, the Burger Court was one of transition, moderation, and self-
restraint: a troubled and fragmented Court in the image of Felix Frankfurter." O'Brien,
supra, at 15. O'Brien also suggested that under Rehnquist "[tlhe trend toward judicial
activism will continue." Id. at 20. He made no effort to reconcile those comments, and
advanced no support for either of them.
370. E.g., Al Kamen, O'Connor on Own Path, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1986, at Al; Al
Kamen, Judging Powell's Performance, WASH. POST, June 28, 1987, at All; Anthony
Lewis, Strength at the Center, N.Y. TIMES, June. 30, 1987, at A31.
Justice Blackmun was quoted in the New York Times as holding the conventional
view of the Burger Court as dominated by centrists. "I, with others, have been trying to
hold the center," Blackmun was reported to have said in an address at George
Washington University National Law Center in February, 1986. Neil A. Lewis, Blackmun
on Search for the Center, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 1986, at L7 (discussing Justice Blackmun's
remarks). "I think we've been fairly lucky in how we've come out in the past two years."
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collection of centrist Justices on the Court, the tendency of the Court
to assume an activist stance, and the "moderate" political cast of the
Court's decisions. Commentators also showed comparatively little
interest in the activism-restraint debate and continued to see the
Court's centrist decisions as temporizing efforts in a political culture
that featured deep ideological divisions.
But by the end of the decade, Reagan's appointments of
Rehnquist to replace Burger as Chief Justice, and of Sandra Day
O'Connor and Antonin Scalia as Associate Justices, coupled with the
retirement of Brennan, had created an impression that the Court was
poised to turn decisively to the right. That impression lingered
throughout the period between 1990 and 1996, with commentators
alternating between the posture expressed in Greenhouse's 1995
article, that something like a rightward constitutional revolution was
at hand,371 and a posture that Greenhouse herself had taken in
previous articles, that, surprisingly, centrist Justices still dominated
the Court.37
Those trends in commentary were to contribute to the enhanced
significance of the idea of the judicial center as a reference point for
analysis of the Court's performance. Commentators on the Court
began to take for granted that they would refer, in some fashion, to
Justices at its center or Justices exhibiting a centrist approach.
Although the terms "judicial center" and "judicial centrist" continued
to be used in multiple ways, they were widely assumed to be clarifying
labels. In particular, they were treated as terms that highlighted the
divisions on the Court between "conservative" or "right" Justices on
the Court and other Justices. The labels "center" and "centrist" were
Id. Before O'Connor replaced Stewart on the Court, Blackmun allegedly said, "I had
always put [Brennan and Marshall] on the left" and "[Burger and Rehnquist] on the
right." Id. "Five of us were in the middle." Id. With O'Connor's appointment, he felt, "I
think it is fairly clear that [she] is on the right and so the division now would be two, four,
and three." Id.
371. That prediction had been made by commentators in the late 1980s. For a
collection of references to such commentary, see Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme
Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining the High Court or Reforming its Role?, 24 AKRON
L. REV. 393 (1990). Particularly visible examples were DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING
RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992) (a journalistic survey
with particular emphasis on the 1988 and 1990 Terms); and Erwin Chemerinsky,
Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989). Greenhouse herself
had described the 1988 Term as "The Year the Court Turned Right." Linda Greenhouse,
The Year the Court Turned Right. N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1989, at Al.
372. Linda Greenhouse, Changed Path for Court?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al;
Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at Al; Slim
Margin: Moderates on Court Defy Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at El; Souter
Anchoring Court's Center, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at Al.
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eventually taken not only as describing the spatial location, but also
as characterizing the political and the jurisprudential postures, of
Justices who were distinct from the right-leaning advocates of a
potential constitutional revolution.373
A. The "Center Holds" Thesis
A crystallization of the ideological dimensions of the idea of the
judicial center in the 1990s374 came in 1995, when James Simon
published a book entitled The Center Holds, "the story of a
conservative judicial revolution that failed," '375  and several
commentators reacted to Simon's claims.
Simon's book covered the 1986 through the 1991 Terms, a period
that scanned the first year of Rehnquist's Chief Justiceship through
the retirements of Brennan and Marshall and their replacements by
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas. He argued that "two
conservative Republican presidents, Ronald Reagan and George
Bush," had sought to "reverse the liberal legacy of the Warren Court"
through their judicial appointments.376  By 1988, Simon felt,
373. For a prediction that a refurbished "centrist liberalism" might emerge in the legal
academy in the last years of the twentieth century, see Mark Kelman, Emerging Centrist
Liberalism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 417, 444 (1991). Kelman argued that centrist thought might
have a renaissance because "the right-wing supply siders were wrong to think that
everyone would prosper if the rich did," and "the left [had been] equally wrong to think
that the masses would prosper if only the few stopped oppressing them." Id.
374. The idea of the judicial center was formulated in a variety of ways in the 1990s. In
addition to being used as an ideological reference point, it was employed by political
scientists working within the tradition of Pritchett. See, e.g., Robert Smith, Uncoupling the
"Centrist Bloc"-An Empirical Analysis of the Thesis of a Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the
United States Supreme Court, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1994). Smith employed voter alignment
analysis to argue that from 1990 through 1992 the "centrists" were not a cohesive voting
bloc and could not "meaningfully be distinguished from the conservatives in terms of their
influence on results and on the content of opinions." Id. at 5, 17. He concluded that "the
label 'centrist' does not identify a particular ideology or pattern of voting that is consistent
from term to term or across subject areas." Id. at 69.
Smith's article illustrated that by the 1990s some scholars using methodologies
derived from the premises of judicial behavioralism had separated the spatial and
ideological dimensions of the concept of a judicial "center." Smith was not only interested
in ascertaining the spatial locations of Justices, but in investigating a possible correlation
between Justices at the "center" of a Court and moderate political ideologies. Id. at 1-3.
We have seen that earlier political science literature had assumed, without actually
demonstrating, that a "center" location and moderate political views might well be
correlated. See supra Part ll.D. Smith sought to demonstrate that a three-Term survey of
the voting patterns of Rehnquist Court Justices suggested they were not. Smith, supra, at
69.
375. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 11 (1995).
376. Id. at 11.
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Rehnquist was operating "with a working conservative majority" of
Reagan appointees and "conservative holdover" White, and by the
early 1990s Bush's appointments of Souter and Thomas were
expected to "put the finishing touches on what conservatives ...
expected to be a solid majority that would steer the Court safely to
the right into the next century." '377
Nonetheless, in "most instances" between 1986 and 1992, Simon
claimed, "the center held" because "liberal justices" were able to
attract support from their more moderate colleagues who refused to
join the ideologically committed conservatives on the right wing of
the Court.378 The showpiece of Simon's analysis was a joint plurality
opinion by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,379 testing the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
statute imposing restrictions on abortion decisions, which signaled
that five votes remained on the Court to preserve Roe v. Wade3 80 and
some measure of protection for abortion rights.38 "With the Casey
decision," Simon claimed, "the momentum had shifted away from the
anti-Roe movement on the Court .... [A] woman's constitutional
right to control her own body during pregnancy seemed established
beyond the Rehnquist Court's recall.
3 8
Simon then generalized from the Casey example. He argued that
when the Casey plurality opinion was taken together with Lee v.
Weisman,3 83 a 5-4 decision in the 1991 Term striking down a
compulsory nonsectarian prayer at a public middle school
graduation,384 the decisions revealed that O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, all of whom participated in the Lee majority, had not joined
the campaign of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas to move
constitutional jurisprudence in a rightward direction.385  That
argument extended a claim made by Ronald Dworkin in an August
13, 1992 article on Casey. Dworkin had entitled the article "The
Center Holds!," referring only to the state of abortion rights on the
Court.386 Simon's use of the same title was intended to suggest that
the influence of the Rehnquist Court's "center" went well beyond the
377. Id.
378. Id. at 12.
379. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
380. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 845-46.
382. SIMON, supra note 375, at 166.
383. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
384. Id. at 597-99.
385. SIMON, supra note 375, at 292-93.
386. Ronald Dworkin, The Center Holds!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1992, at 29.
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abortion context.
Having put forth this thesis, Simon had some difficulty
supporting it. He presented internal accounts of cases in four areas:
racial harassment, abortion, criminal procedure, and the First
Amendment's speech and religion clauses.3 87  In two of those
accounts, Justices whom he described as "conservatives on the right
wing" prevailed, joining majorities who declined to extend an 1866
civil rights statute to racial harassment in the private sector and who
curtailed a series of Warren Court constitutional protections for
criminal defendants.388 In one of Simon's other accounts, which
featured the Court's response to Establishment Clause and free
speech issues, only Lee v. Weisman provided evidence of the
influence of centrist Justices. In the other line of First Amendment
decisions, in which five-judge majorities vindicated speech rights by
invalidating federal and state statutes criminalizing the burning of the
American flag as a political protest, only four of the Justices in the
majority were, in Simon's terms, liberals or centrists.389 The fifth
Justice was one of Simon's "conservatives on the right wing,"
Scalia.390
In addition to those problems of documentation, the timing of
Simon's book was somewhat awkward. The book was published in
August, 1995, just after, one reviewer noted, the appearance of
"starkly conservative, five-to-four rulings" in the Court's 1994 Term,
the decisions that had prompted Greenhouse to declare that the
"center is a void." '391 Kennedy and O'Connor, the reviewer suggested,
had both joined the Court's "conservative bloc," and "Simon's
understandable desire to extrapolate broadly from the events of




The newly constituted Court featured a division in which, "abortion
aside, on most hotly contested issues O'Connor and Kennedy now
side with the highly conservative trio of Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas," so that "Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens and Souter [were] on
the short end of the count." '393 In sum, the reviewer claimed, "[t]he
387. SIMON, supra note 375 passim.
388. Id. at 48-49, 178-81.
389. Id. at 270-75.
390. Id. at 274.
391. David J. Garrow, The Center Folds, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1995, at 32, reprinted in
David J. Garrow, Simple Simon: Supremely Sanguine, Supremely Stubborn, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 969, 978 (1996).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 979.
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'center' hasn't held. '394
When a symposium was held on Simon's book in 1996,391 most
participants were critical of his "center holds" thesis. They believed
that the thesis had little descriptive or predictive value, either because
Simon had extrapolated from too little evidence, or because he had
been too hasty to conclude that centrist Justices were dominating the
Court, or because he had failed to recognize that if there was a center,
it had moved rightward since the Burger Court years, or simply
because he had misunderstood the significance of the Court's current
jurisprudential conflicts.396
Nonetheless the comments had the cumulative effect of
confirming the importance of the terms "center" and "centrist" as
evocative labels in the lexicon of constitutional commentary. Despite
their differences with Simon, his critics tacitly acknowledged that the
labels captured three defining features of the Court in the last years
of the twentieth century. One was that the Court now contained no
"liberals" in the sense in which that label had been applied to
members of the Warren and Burger Courts: all its Justices who did
not tilt decisively to the right were centrists of one kind or another.3 97
Another was the fact that even if the Court was appropriately labeled
"starkly conservative," only three of its Justices could be
characterized as consistent supporters of sweeping rightward
constitutional changes.3 98 The other two "conservatives," Kennedy
and O'Connor, were far less predictable, and thus Court majorities,
throughout the 1990s, were more likely to alternate between "right"
and "centrist" postures than to move decisively rightward. 99
The last feature followed from the first two. Although the
"center" of the Court may have moved rightward, centrists on the
Court now consisted of all those Justices who did not appear to
support, on various grounds, a dramatic turn rightward in
constitutional jurisprudence. This meant that there were six centrist
Justices on the Court from 1994 on, representing a decisive "anti-
right" majority.
394. Id. at 979.
395. See 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 855 (1996).
396. See John P. MacKenzie, The Legal Culture, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903 (1996);
Steven R. Shapiro, The Center Holds, But Where is the Center? A Response to James
Simon, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 935 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, Who Cares?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 899 (1996); Garrow, supra note 391.
397. Kim I. Eisler, A Defense of Activism, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 921 (1996)
("There is certainly no extreme left on the Court anymore.").
398. Eisler listed Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas in this category. Id. at 921.
399. See Garrow, supra note 391, at 973.
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Simon's book had precipitated a common reading of the internal
dynamics of the Rehnquist Court, one that solidified among
commentators in the late 1990s, as the Court's personnel remained
constant. That common reading was as follows. The idea of the
judicial center was an important starting point in understanding the
identity of the Rehnquist Court. This was because the constitutional
jurisprudence of that Court at the close of the twentieth century was a
struggle for influence between two groups: the Justices on the right
and everyone else. "Everyone else" was a centrist or a potential
rightist. Most of those commenting on Simon's book were not
convinced that the center had held. But they agreed that one could
not meaningfully discuss the Court, in the 1990s, without addressing
the idea of its center. °°
B. Centrist Judging and the Atmospherics of the Rehnquist Court
With Simon's thesis about the Rehnquist Court, and the reaction
to it, the twentieth century intellectual journey of the idea of the
judicial center reached the time frame in which Greenhouse had
popularized an image of the Court as consumed by a clash between
rightward leaning Justices and a potentially powerless center.
Greenhouse's article had used the terms "center" and "centrist" in
three different ways, and had taken those multiple meanings of
"center" and "centrist" to be complementary rather than
inconsistent. 40 ' A centrist Justice, or a Justice at a Court's center,
could be one whose voting record, in cases with discernible policy
outcomes, placed the Justice approximately midway between the
Justices who represented the "left" and "right" extremes on a policy
spectrum. In addition, a centrist Justice could be one who exhibited a
moderate or pragmatic political sensibility. Or a centrist Justice could
be one who was jurisprudentially cautious or incrementalist,
disinclined to endorse sweeping doctrinal changes. Often centrist
Justices, or Justices at the center, exhibited all those tendencies at
once.
As the personnel on the Rehnquist Court remained constant in
the first years of the twenty-first century, the terms "center" and
"centrist," with their multiple connotations, seemed increasingly well-
suited to describe that Court's doctrinal dynamics. But it would be
conclusory to claim that the emergence of the terms to prominence in
commentary was itself an explanation for their saliency. The terms
400. See Eisler, supra note 397, at 921; Garrow, supra note 391, at 973.
401. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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became salient, as well as prominent, because they helped capture
some altered features of the Court's internal culture. They provided
an entry into the atmospherics of the later Rehnquist Court.4 °2
When the "Rehnquist Court" eventually comes to be
encapsulated, the years between 1986 and 1994 will need to be
distinguished from 1994 onward. The distinction will not necessarily
rest on the tone or character of the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. It will rest on the composition of the Court itself. The
Rehnquist Court, between the 1994 Term and the present, has had no
changes in personnel. In only one period in American constitutional
history-the years between 1812 and 1823-has the Court's
membership remained constant for a longer duration. Moreover, in
no previous epoch in American history has the Court been composed,
for a longer period, of Justices who held the same professional
position before their appointments. Eight of the nine current Justices
were judges at the time of their nomination to the Court. These two
features of the Rehnquist Court since 1994 can be seen as forming the
background against which the internal developments sketched out in
this subsection have taken place. Although the features might at first
seem incidental, I will be arguing that they are not only historically
striking but highly relevant to understanding the atmosphere of the
current Court.
Some noteworthy internal developments have occurred on the
Court since the mid-1990s. One has been the presence of two
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, who propound a revisionist approach to
constitutional interpretation, grounded on fidelity to the text, history,
and the "original meaning" of constitutional provisions, that has
undercut a series of established judicial interpretations of the
Constitution in place, in some instances, since the 1940s." 3 A third
Justice, Rehnquist, has seemed sympathetic to that mission, if
somewhat less inclined to endorse Scalia's and Thomas's interpretive
revisionism. Together those three Justices have generated a
persistent intellectual pressure on their colleagues: pressure to join
402. The descriptions of internal features of the Rehnquist Court in this Section are not
based on first-hand accounts of Justices or law clerks. Although some literature discussing
internal dimensions of the Court exists, see, e.g., EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT (1998), I have not relied upon it. My comments in this Section are
offered merely as suppositions, based on information that is available to anyone paying
relatively close attention to the Court during the last decade.
403. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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them in their revisionist forays or find reasons for not doing so.4'1
No comparable interpretive revisionism from the left has been
present on the Court. No Justice has been insisting, as Warren or
Douglas or Brennan or Marshall periodically did, that the
Constitution is bottomed on principles of social justice, or
fundamental fairness, or the equality, dignity, and freedom of all
human beings, and that if its provisions did not expressly codify those
values, they should be interpreted as doing so.405 But there are
Justices on the current Court-Stevens, Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer-who came to maturity when the
legacy of the New Deal was taken to be an established feature of
governance in America and when the Warren Court's brand of
revisionism was being implemented.4"6  Confronted with the
prospective dismantling of landmarks from that time, they have
reacted with some uneasiness. Presented with revisionist interpretive
arguments based on textual fidelity and history, they have responded
with alternative arguments. Mindful of past Court majorities'
rhetorical commitments to using the Constitution as a vehicle for
social justice, they have appeared loath to abandon openly those
commitments. °7
These currents have contributed to an intellectual culture on the
Court that encourages Justices to flesh out their interpretive
approaches to constitutional provisions and to engage in debate with
their colleagues about such approaches. The culture is already
hospitable to intellectual exchange among Justices because of the
constancy of the Court's personnel, Rehnquist's personal affability
and laissez-faire attitude toward the airing of differing views, and the
pre-Court experience of all of the Court's members save the Chief
Justice. Eight Justices on the Rehnquist Court have had previous
404. For more on the emergence of originalism as a theory of constitutional
interpretation, and the evolution of an originalist perspective between the late 1970s and
the first decade of the twenty-first century, see White, The Arrival of History, supra note
27, at 587-96, 628-29.
405. See generally WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 148, at
318-25; THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1993).
406. Stevens was born in 1920, Ginsburg in 1933, Breyer in 1938, and Souter in 1939. 2
JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITr, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1997) 955,
959, and 961.
407. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686-717 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73-
97 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.); Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376-89 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting,
joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
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careers as judges on courts who made decisions collectively. They
came to the Court familiar with collegial discourse, regular
intellectual exchange, and the process of circulating and critiquing
draft opinions. And unlike their predecessors on the Court, they not
only had multiple law clerks to assist in their research, they had the
use of word processors, which created opportunities for Justices to
work outside the Court building and to generate multiple drafts of
documents in a comparatively rapid fashion. The circulation of
memoranda, draft opinions, and other written communications have
become the heart of the Justices' exchanges with one another.
Another feature of the present Court's composition has arguably
contributed to its atmospherics in a different way. All its Justices are
"post-Fortas," and five of its Justices "post-Bork," appointees. The
nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice to replace Earl Warren in
1968, with the filibustering of Fortas's nomination by Republicans
because of his close ties to the administration of Lyndon Johnson, and
the subsequent partisan opposition to two of Richard Nixon's
nominees to the Court in the 1970s, ushered in a climate in which
senatorial scrutiny of Court nominees has often been intense,
ideological antipathy has become an acceptable ground for opposing
a candidate's nomination, and Court appointees have increasingly
been lower court judges without visible political affiliations or
controversial records."° Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia, all
appointed after the Fortas debacle, were lower court judges at the
time of their nominations.
The remaining Justices on the Court were appointed after the
abortive effort of the Reagan administration to nominate Robert
Bork in 1987. In the wake of Bork's defeat, the Reagan
administration eventually409 resorted to the familiar post-Fortas
formula, nominating Anthony Kennedy, a lower court judge with an
inconspicuous judicial record and no identification with political or
social controversy. That same pattern was followed in the
nominations of Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. All were lower court
judges with distinguished professional credentials, although Souter's
408. On Fortas's abortive nomination to the Chief Justiceship and his subsequent
resignation from the Court, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS, 327-33, 370-76 (1990);
LUCAS POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 468-81 (2000).
409. After Bork's defeat, the next Reagan nominee, Douglas Ginsburg of the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, was also perceived by his political opponents as a rightist.
Ginsburg withdrew his nomination after the disclosure that he had smoked marijuana in
his youth became an embarrassment to an administration engaged in a visible "war on
drugs." For an account of the Bork nomination and its aftermath, see generally Ronald
M. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (1987).
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career, as a prosecutor and judge in New Hampshire, had been
comparatively obscure. Ginsburg and Breyer had written a
considerable amount of legal scholarship, and Ginsburg had been a
visible proponent of legal remedies for gender discrimination, but
their work was well within the academic mainstream, and they both
had a reputation as judicial "moderates.
' 410
Five members of the Rehnquist Court, then, might have been
inclined to gravitate to the "center" simply because the screening
process that put them on the Court made it so difficult to confirm
candidates with views that were perceived to be on one end or
another of the political spectrum. The nominations of the remaining
members of the Court had not been constrained in the same fashion.
Rehnquist, whose ideological inclinations were discernible on his
nomination, was given close scrutiny but survived.41' O'Connor, the
first woman nominated to the Court, had impressive professional
qualifications and held an obscure judgeship in Arizona; she was not
placed under intense scrutiny. Neither was Scalia, whose nomination
was sent to the Senate along with that of Rehnquist for the Chief
Justiceship. Rehnquist's track record on the Court from 1971 to 1986
provoked some opposition, and in the process Scalia, who had not
had occasion to pass on many visible constitutional issues as a lower
court judge, was unanimously confirmed. Thomas's confirmation
process was uniquely bizarre, exceeding even that of Bork in its
visibility and intertwining issues related to ideology with issues
related to race and sexual contacts in the workplace, but Thomas also
survived.4 !2
In post-Fortas, post-Bork terms, then, two of the three current
410. See Horace E. Johns, Nine Means to an End: The Members of the U.S. Supreme
Court (pt. 2), 39 TENN. B.J. 27, 31 (2003) (finding that Breyer is pragmatic instead of
strongly partisan); William H. Freivogel & Kathleen Best, Ginsburg a Mastermind of
Women's Rights; Her Decisions Helped Forge Social Change, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 15, 1993, at IC (asserting that Ginsburg was "roughly in the ideological center" of the
D.C. Circuit before joining the Supreme Court).
411. Information from Justice Robert Jackson's Court papers.revealed that Rehnquist,
while Jackson's law clerk in the 1952 Term, had written a memorandum to Jackson stating
that in his opinion Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the decision justifying
"separate but equal" racially segregated facilities, "was right and should be reaffirmed."
Rehnquist acknowledged writing the memorandum but said that Jackson had a practice of
asking his clerks to argue both sides of cases before the Court. Rehnquist's co-clerk that
Term, Donald Cronson, subsequently confirmed Rehnquist's account, and he was
eventually confirmed. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 406-09 (1976).
412. See generally PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS,
ROBERT BORK AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
NOMINATION BATTLES (1992); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRITICAL JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1993).
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Rehnquist Court Justices associated with revisionist, right-leaning
constitutional jurisprudence were high profile nominees, and Scalia
might well have been but for his being nominated along with
Rehnquist. All the remaining Justices, including O'Connor, were
nominees whose candidacies were designed to forestall intense
political scrutiny, being either lower court judges with comparatively
low profiles (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter) or lower court judges with
"moderate" track records (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer). So if
centrism, in the sense of political moderation, was to be associated
with judges with ideologically balanced judicial records who had
otherwise avoided social and political controversy, all the Rehnquist
Court Justices save Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas were potential
centrists.
When these atmospheric features are added up, the following
picture of the Rehnquist Court emerges. The Rehnquist Court, since
1994, has been an institution whose members have had the usual
incentives Supreme Court Justices have to develop their own views of
constitutional interpretation and to exchange those views with their
colleagues. Those incentives may well have been heightened, in
recent years, by the fact that all the Court's members are now familiar
with the process of deciding constitutional cases and aware of the
ambitious doctrinal agenda of some Justices. Moreover, despite the
vigor of some of the exchanges among Justices that have found their
way into opinions, there is no reason to think that norms of
collegiality have been violated by what amounts to interpretive
competitions among some Justices. Not only have all the Justices
(who have now served with one another for at least a decade) had
ample opportunities to know each other as colleagues, the relative de-
emphasis the Court places on extended colloquies in conference, and
its strong emphasis on the exchange of ideas through written
communications, depersonalizes exchanges.413
The framework of interpretive debate on constitutional issues on
413. See LAZARUS, supra note 402. The book, which was published in 1998 but based
on the author's experiences as a clerk for Justice Blackmun in the 1988 Term, described
the Court as "an institution broken into unyielding factions that have largely given up on a
meaningful exchange of their respective views or, for that matter, a meaningful explication
or defense of their own views." Id. at 6. One commentator, after calling Lazarus's portrait
"rather hyperbolic," noted that Lazarus's book appeared "during a term that was marked
by unanimous decisions and a remarkable show of consensus on several very difficult
issues." David Savage, A Journalist's Perspective, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 162-63 (Martin Belsky ed., 2002). "If this is a Court that is hopelessly
divided into warring ideological factions," Savage concluded, "I have missed the story."
Id. at 164.
116720051
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the current Court has been shaped by the fact that at least two
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, consistently advance revisionist
interpretations of many constitutional provisions, grounded on
originalist-inspired theories of judicial fidelity. The regular presence
of arguments for doctrinal revisionism means that Justices are
commonly confronted with the option of repudiating Court
precedents with some historical pedigree. A shifting majority of
Justices appears to be struggling with the implications of embracing
that possibility. If one thinks of most of the members of that shifting
majority as centrists-using the term in the combined sense of
jurisprudential minimalism or incrementalism 414 (as opposed to
sweeping revisionism) and the avoidance of ideological extremes (as
opposed to a firm embrace of a right-leaning constitutional
ideology)-then the idea of the judicial center can be seen as a
window into the current Court.
VI. UNFINISHED BUSINESS
If this effort to unpack the idea of a judicial center has suggested
that the labels "center" and "centrist" have some potential to clarify
the current dynamics of the Supreme Court, the conclusion is not
much of an occasion for dancing in the streets. The history of the
idea of the judicial center reveals that the concept has been used in
quite different ways, that some of those ways have the potential to be
quite unilluminating, and that even those definitions of "center" and
"centrist" which seem to have some contemporary analytical
purchase invite oversimplification. By way of summary, then, it
seems worth recalling some of the difficulties with the various
meanings of "center" and "centrist," and suggesting how additional
work might result in the terms being employed in more helpful ways.
A. Clarifying Judicial Behavioralism
The initial meaning of "judicial center" was associated with a
starkly behavioralist theory of judging, in which the decisionmaking
process of Supreme Court Justices was equated with that of members
of Congress, the performance of Justices was associated almost
exclusively with their voting records in cases with discernible policy
dimensions, and the outcomes in those cases were given political
labels.415 Even in a universe of commentary whose practitioners agree
that Justices are a species of lawmakers and that constitutional
414. For a more extended discussion of those terms, see infra, text at notes 435-59.
415. See supra Part I.A-B.
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adjudication is a form of policymaking,416 unrefined judicial
behavioralism runs the risk of ignoring vital elements in the calculus
of judges. One reason why the activism-restraint debate began to
preoccupy commentators after the Second World War, and why a
process jurisprudential perspective began to dominate commentary
on the Court in the 1950s and 1960s, was that analyzing the
performance of Justices along the established behavioralist axes of
"left" and "right" voting "blocs" seemed intuitively unrewarding.
When nearly all the Justices on the Supreme Court could be said to
be sympathetic to the legislative policies of the New Deal and its
legacy, and yet those Justices were consistently divided over whether
they should exercise their constitutional review powers to override
legislation, conventional descriptions of "left" and "right"
policymaking that had been fashioned in the 1930s no longer seemed
helpful.
After two decades of scholarship by process theorists who
believed that the categories of activism and restraint came far closer
to illuminating Supreme Court decisionmaking than conventional
political labels or voting alignment studies, some of the inherent
difficulties in behavioralist definitions of a judicial center were
exposed. How meaningful was the spatial term "center" if voting
patterns showed that a large number of Justices agreed with many of
their colleagues in nonunanimous cases? More fundamentally, what
did voting alignments reveal about judicial motivation? When a
judge joined or declined to join an opinion, did that mean that the
judge necessarily endorsed or opposed the outcome that opinion
justified? Did it mean that the judge accepted, or rejected, the
justifications advanced in the opinion? If much of constitutional
adjudication, as process theorists suggested, turned on theories of the
judicial function, how did one know whether a judge was supporting,
or opposing, the policies embodied in legislative or executive acts, or
whether that judge was supporting, or opposing, judicial scrutiny of
those policies?
Further, the integrity of a judicial center, as a spatial location,
was dependent on the integrity of spatial locations on the "left" and
"right" of a Court. How could one tell whether those locations were
coherent? How did one know that outcomes in a case were "left" or
"right" outcomes in the first place? Students of American politics
416. Of course there are some contemporary commentators who do not hold those
views of judging and constitutional adjudication, but their number would seem small
enough to be discounted.
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assumed that the contemporary political spectrum was always
changing, so that the policies favored by "liberals" or "conservatives"
also changed with time. Given this phenomenon, how could
commentators confidently associate outcomes with "left" or "right"
judicial philosophies? To take just one example, we have seen that in
her 1995 article Greenhouse had used Stevens as the "left" end of the
Rehnquist Court's spectrum, and Rehnquist as the "right" end, for
the purpose of identifying Justices at the Court's center.' 7 She had
also described Scalia's voting alignments as placing him far closer to
Rehnquist than to Stevens. But in two of the most visible
constitutional decisions of the 1989 and 1990 Terms, testing the
constitutionality of state and federal statutes criminalizing flag
desecration, Scalia, as noted, had joined majorities invalidating the
statutes, whereas Stevens, along with Rehnquist, had voted to uphold
the legislation. 19
The coherence of a behavioralist-inspired spatial meaning of
"judicial center" is thus dependent on a series of simplifying
assumptions, some of which commentators may be unable to
stomach. Even when those assumptions are modified to consider
doctrinal, institutional, and other "process" variables introduced by
legal scholars, spatial definitions of the center of a Court, if they are
to have any analytical value, seem to depend on descriptions of that
Court's "left" and "right," which may be outmoded or arbitrary.42°
Proponents of spatial conceptions of the term "center" have
emphasized the potential of voting alignment analysis to predict
417. See Greenhouse, supra note 1. More refined versions of this methodology have
been recently applied to the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S.
Supreme Court (1953-1999), 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 146 (2002) (outlining a spatial
spectrum with Stevens at one end, Thomas at the other, and Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Rehnquist at points from left to right).
418. See Greenhouse, supra note 1.
419. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 311 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 398 (1989).
420. For an interesting recent effort to modify a starkly behavioralist "attitudinal"
model of Supreme Court voting by interjecting variables connected to the process by
which cases come to the Court, such as the particular federal circuit court that decided the
case below, see Theodore W. Ruger et al. The Supreme Court Forecasting Project, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1157 (2004). The model employed by the forecasters "did better
than ... legal experts in forecasting the outcomes" of the Court's 2002 cases, "due in large
part to its ability to predict more accurately the important votes of the moderate Justices
... at the center of the current Court." Id. at 1150. The legal experts "did best at
predicting the votes of the more ideologically extreme Justices, but had difficulty
predicting the centrist Justices." Id. The forecasting model did "particularly well in
forecasting 'economic activity' cases," while the legal specialists "did comparatively better
in the 'judicial power' cases." Id.
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which Justices' votes will be crucial in closely divided cases. Such
predictions are, of course, thought to be of great significance in
constitutional litigation and commentary: practitioners in those areas
devote a good deal of energy to identifying Justices whose voting
patterns indicate that they could join opposing "blocs." Attention has
recently been paid to O'Connor as a decisive spatial centrist on the
current Court, with some observers claiming that "when Justice
O'Connor asks a question at oral argument, ... nothing is more
important ... than making sure you've addressed her concerns." '421 If
the label "centrist" had the capacity to particularize those concerns as
well as to identify Justices likely to provide tie-breaking votes, it
would be of considerable help to anyone interested in getting to the
heart of a Court's dynamics.
But the spatial meaning of center does not simply suffer from the
difficulties incumbent on locating Justices on a Court between liberals
and conservatives.422 It also fails to clarify what a centrist judicial
stance means for individual judges. Concluding that a judge such as
O'Connor might qualify for a centrist spatial position says nothing
about why she might be inclined to join one bloc or another in a given
case. It only says that if comparatively firm "left" and "right" blocs
exist on a Court, a center judge votes with one about as much as the
other.
Assume, however, that some form of voting alignment analysis
could demonstrate that a Justice was occupying the center space on a
Court for a sufficient amount of time to be noteworthy. It would
seem that the next step would be to understand why, which would
require an analysis of that Justice's decisionmaking calculus in
sufficient depth to produce an understanding of his or her
jurisprudential sensibility. That task does not seem insurmountable,
but would it produce uniform results for all Justices identified as
centrists? It seems hard to imagine, for example, that biographically
and doctrinally oriented studies of O'Connor and Kennedy, the two
Justices regularly identified as most likely to join different blocs on
the current Court, would produce anything like a common
characterization of Justices at a Court's spatial center. Without such
421. Charles Lane, Courting O'Connor: Why the Chief Justice isn't the Chief Justice,
WASH. POST MAG., July 4, 2004, at 10, 14 (quoting Richard Lazarus).
422. Lane described O'Connor as "the key centrist on a Supreme Court polarized
between liberals and conservatives," and as "straddling" the "voting blocs" on the Court.
Id. at 12, 14. In Lane's analysis, O'Connor is a more important "centrist" than Kennedy
because "she provides a fifth vote to make a liberal majority more than Kennedy does."
Id.
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a chargcterization, the value of the label reduces itself to a descriptive
term for voting patterns of Justices that have already occurred. As
such it may have some postdictive utility, but cannot be claimed to be
a predictive tool.
4 23
One might nonetheless hope that sophisticated versions of voting
alignment analysis, combined with intensive examinations of the
jurisprudential postures of Justices whose voting patterns identified
them as spatial centrists, might give the spatial dimensions of the idea
of a judicial center some purchase. It hardly needs to be pointed out
that no such work has yet appeared.
B. Clarifying Centrism as a Political Ideology
The second common meaning associated with the labels "center"
or "centrist," that of political moderation or pragmatism, would seem
no less susceptible to oversimplification than any label derived from
political ideology and applied to judging. We have seen that two sorts
of difficulties attend the use of conventional political labels such as
"liberal" or "conservative" to describe the postures of judges,
difficulties related to inherent ambiguities in the use of those labels
and difficulties incumbent in the task of ascertaining the
jurisprudential dimensions of the labels. Calling any political actor a
"liberal" or a "conservative" requires a baseline definition of those
terms, and such baselines are slippery. Over the course of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the term "liberal" underwent a
major definitional shift in the vocabulary of American politics,
moving from its "classical" version, signifying one who favored
comparatively few governmental restrictions on economic and
political activity, to its "modern" version, signaling a belief in the
affirmative use of governmental power to further humane and
progressive social ends.4 24 The label "liberal" thus called up quite
different political visions at different times, complicating the meaning
of judicial "liberalism."425
The label "conservative" brings its own difficulties, which
primarily follow from the fact that the term has been employed both
423. Ruger et al., supra note 420, point out that "virtually all legal and political science
scholarship on the Supreme Court is retrospective in nature." Id. at 1155-56. Not only
"legal critiques of decisions" but "political science models that make claims of 'prediction,'
... typically regress past data sets to assess consistency with various motivational
hypotheses." Id. Although some studies "speak in terms of 'predictive' accuracy, what
they do is more technically called 'postdiction.' " Id. at 1153-54 n.17.
424. See WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 148, at 151.
425. Id. at 151-56.
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universalistically and contextually. As a universalistic label,
conservatism has been identified with support for the maintenance of
an existing political order, whatever values that order embodies.426
As a contextual label, conservatism refers to a position on a historical
or contemporary political spectrum. The universalistic and
contextual dimensions of conservatism are sometimes combined in
the claim that conservatives of all stripes tend to favor gradual rather
than rapid change.427 But one cannot know what support for gradual
as opposed to more sweeping change means without a sense of the
existing status quo. And if history is viewed as a process of
continuous, qualitative change,428 the content of the status quo can
never remain constant, so that conservative political actors cannot be
said to hold identical substantive visions across time. It seems that
the best one can do with the label "conservative" is to associate it
with a constantly changing situational posture.4 29
Finally, the labels liberal and conservative, as political referents,
convey nothing about theories of the judicial function. When one
characterizes a judge as a "liberal" or a "conservative," does the
characterization presuppose that the judge has a "liberal" or
"conservative" theory of the interpretive role of judges, and, if so,
how might such a theory be described? The only way to avoid that
question is to subsume theories of the judicial function in political
ideologies, which some unreconstructed judicial behavioralists have
done,430 but that move serves to highlight the difficulties incumbent
upon the application of crude behavioralist methodologies to judicial
decisionmaking.
We have seen that in the 1950s and 1960s some commentators
who were preoccupied with the activism-restraint debate assumed
that if one thought about judging in accordance with that debate's
axes, judges who consistently maintained a deferential theory of their
power to scrutinize the actions of other branch actors could have
426. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1139, 1182-83 (2002).
427. For a classic formulation, see CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA
9 (1982).
428. This "historicist" view of history (as distinguished from a view of history as a
cyclical process in which societies emerge, mature, degenerate, dissolve, and. reemerge)
has been dominant in America since at least the late nineteenth century. See DOROTHY
Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE xv, 94-97 (1991).
429. For an extended discussion of the various meanings of political liberalism and
conservatism, concluding that conventional approaches to defining them have been
"positively riddled with problems," see Young, supra note 426, at 1187-97.
430. See Rodell, For Every Justice, supra note 194, at 700-01; Schubert, Ideologies and
Attitudes, supra note 197, at 25-26.
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been described as judicial "conservatives," if not necessarily as judges
who supported conservative political goals.431  When legislative
majorities restricted the rights of racial or political minorities in the
1950s, judicial deference to that legislation was sometimes
characterized as politically as well as jurisprudentially conservative.
When legislative majorities regulated economic activity or
redistributed economic benefits in the same time period, judicial
deference to that legislation could have been seen as a
jurisprudentially conservative posture that supported liberal policies.
Other permutations were possible: the fact was that deference, as
opposed to activism, had come to be thought of in some circles as a
"conservative" jurisprudential approach.
But any abiding belief in a bright-line distinction between
political ideology and theories of the judicial function did not survive
the 1970s. When commentators concluded that nearly all the
members of the Supreme Court were activists of one political
persuasion or another, the jurisprudential implications of deference
became less clear. Some commentators, we have seen, suggested that
the doctrinal caution of Burger Court Justices reflected substantive
preferences rather than theories of the judicial function.432 In general,
commentators lost interest in the permutations of liberalism,
conservatism, activism, and deference that had occupied the scholars
preoccupied with the activism-restraint debate.
The label "centrist" was first applied to judges in the 1970s and
was intended to capture a judge's political ideology as well as that
judge's spatial location. Commentators typically employed the terms
"moderate" or "pragmatic" to describe centrist judges. But if
"centrist" is used to signify a stance of moderation in a judge, the
clarity of the term would again seem dependent on the existence of
comparative baselines. Suppose conventional characterizations of the
current Court as a collection of right-leaning Justices and centrists of
various stripes are adopted. What is the baseline for determining a
"centrist" ideological stance on a Court in which there are not
thought to be any Justices on the "left?" If there is no left baseline on
the current Court, the hypothetical left end of the spectrum must be a
baseline drawn from politics at large. But why, when the primary
purpose of labeling Justices on the current Court as centrists is to
clarify their perspectives alongside those of their colleagues, would
baselines drawn from political actors in the general population be
431. See Clark, Unprincipled Decision, supra note 193, at 660-62.




This suggests that if the label "centrist" is intended to convey the
ideological stances of current Justices, considered as ordinary political
actors, it does not really mean Justices who hold views, which mark
them as neither predictable liberals nor predictable conservatives.
Centrist Justices are "non-right" Justices: Justices not inclined wholly
to embrace the right-leaning constitutional jurisprudence of
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. As Kim Eisler put it in a comment
on Simon's The Center Holds: "We have faced ... conservative
threats before and the liberal wing has held. Now it seems that the
best we can hope for is that the center will hold .... Now we are told
to be grateful that 'the center has held,' because expectations... have
so dramatically fallen." '433
If the principal political connotation of the label "centrist," as
applied to Justices on the current Court, is "non-rightist" rather than
moderate or pragmatist, several additional unexamined issues would
seem to be opened up. Is the characterization of the current Court as
lacking any "liberals" just a way of saying that contemporary
American political culture has moved rightward since the 1970s? Is it
a way of saying that in the current climate of political opinion no
current version of a Warren Court liberal would be nominated to the
Court or could be confirmed? Or is it a way of suggesting that it is
unclear what a judicial liberal would be in the twenty-first century?
In sum, if the stereotype of a twentieth century liberal Justice has
now become a historical memory, and no such Justices serve or are
expected to serve on the Court in the short run, then the only
meaning of the term "centrist," as a political label, is non-right. And
as such the label seems far too broad to be of much use. Surely there
are ideological differences between Kennedy and Breyer, Ginsburg
and O'Connor, Stevens and Souter that the label "centrist" obscures.
C. Clarifying Centrist Jurisprudence
Finally, there is the meaning of "centrist" as a jurisprudential
philosophy. A fair amount of recent work has appeared on this
topic.434 Moreover, there appears to be a common impression among
433. Eisler, supra note 397, at 916-17.
434. The commentator who has done the most to portray jurisprudential centrism as a
more considered perspective than the "ad hoc" decisionmaking posture associated with
"centrist activism" by scholars in the 1980s has been Cass R. Sunstein. Sunstein's effort,
which began with Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements] and culminated in ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter
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commentators as to what jurisprudential centrism on the Rehnquist
Court means: it refers to a tendency of some Justices to decide cases
on relatively narrow doctrinal grounds. The current association of
jurisprudential centrism with what is now typically called judicial
minimalism435  or incrementalism 4 36 is reminiscent of the 1980s
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME], was doubtlessly conceived in the shadow of potential
rightward doctrinal revisionism, but has been more than an attempt to encourage a
"center" of the Court to "hold." Sunstein's "judicial minimalism" draws on some of the
contributions of process theorists, especially the idea of avoiding broadly generalized
constitutional justifications which cannot sustain their application to a large range of
future cases. But unlike the process theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, who argued that if
transcendent constitutional principles justifying a decision could not be articulated the
Court should leave the resolution to other branch actors, Sunstein seeks to make a virtue
out of judicial decisions that are "incompletely theorized," grounded on tentative
justifications that might (or might not) be extended over time, and which anticipate
further dialogue about them in the culture at large. The real difficulty with most
aggressive judicial intervention to resolve contested social issues, Sunstein suggests, is not
that it is unlikely to be "principled" in the process theorists' sense, but that it is likely to be
"maximalist": grounded on justifications that are too broad to bear the weight of future
cases. Sunstein's approach thus anticipates cautious, "incremental" decisionmaking,
featuring aligned sequences of cases that collectively may be capable of revealing a
broader theoretical approach if that approach can be made to square with the
foundational values of a democratic society. Id. at 259-63.
In a review of Sunstein's The Partial Constitution (1993), Mark Tushnet described
Sunstein as "articulat[ing] a certain form of legal centrism." Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur
at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1993). Although in calling Sunstein a centrist,
Tushnet was primarily referring to the substantive goals for constitutional law that
Sunstein endorsed, he devoted considerable attention to what he called "the rhetoric of
centrism," which included a discussion of Sunstein's theories of the judicial function. Id. at
1098-1114.
435. The currently common meaning of judicial minimalism equates it with what
Sunstein has called "incompletely theorized" justifications for the results reached in cases.
Minimalist justifications in an opinion tend to focus on the particular factual and doctrinal
contexts of the case being decided and openly decline to extend the implications very far
beyond those contexts. See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 434,
at 1735-36, 1771-72; see also Liza Weiman Hanks, Note, Justice Souter: Defining
"Substantive Neutrality" in an Age of Religious Politics, 48 STAN. L. REV. 903, 906 (1996)
(noting Justice Souter's movement away from centrist Justices such as Kennedy and
O'Connor in the early 1990s); Lyle Denniston, The Pivotal Vote, BALT. SUN, Oct. 1, 1995,
at 1A (describing O'Connor's "style of crafting open-ended broadly phrased doctrine" as
placing her at the center of the Court).
436. Judicial incrementalism is related to but distinct from judicial minimalism. It
refers to a stance that emphasizes the step-by-step building of doctrinal frameworks
through sequences of related cases. An incrementalist approach does not require that
each step in the creation of a doctrinal framework be incompletely theorized, so it is not
synonymous with minimalism, and Sunstein does not use the term. But since incompletely
theorized justifications might be thought to anticipate the eventual statement of more fully
theorized ones after doctrinal connections among sequences of cases are better
appreciated, the postures of incrementalism and minimalism have been regularly linked by
commentators. For a particularly helpful example, see Young, supra note 426, at 1183-84
(noting that incrementalism was a feature of the conservatism of Edmund Burke, who is
the classic example of a situational or minimalist conservative).
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literature that described centrist judges on the Burger Court as
making "ad hoc" decisions. But whereas ad hoc decisionmaking on
the Burger Court was seen as a reluctance, or an inability, to make
fundamental choices among competing constitutional values,
minimalism or incrementalism on the Rehnquist Court is commonly
seen as a more considered and positive approach. Minimalism or
incrementalism is a self-consciously centrist posture, commentators
suggest, because it enables Justices on the Court to avoid embracing
the interpretive principles associated with rightward constitutional
revisionism without entangling themselves with the jurisprudential
legacy of Warren Court activism.437 It also allows Justices to preserve
doctrinal, theoretical, and even ideological flexibility in future
cases.438 Such flexibility appeals to centrist judges because it widens
their intellectual options while aggrandizing their power.439
The association of judicial centrism with a minimalist or
incrementalist jurisprudential stance represents a start toward
understanding the jurisprudential implications of a judicial center.
But unexplored issues remain. In particular, the emergence of
attempts to describe the center of a Court in jurisprudential terms
would appear to bring back into constitutional commentary the series
of issues raised by the activism-restraint debate. If centrist
minimalism and incrementalism reflect a theory of the judicial
function, what sort of theory is it? Should the postures be regarded as
a response to activism on the Court, or as versions of activism? Are
they primarily interpretive postures, efforts to identify guiding
principles for judges in the application of authoritative legal sources,
or institutional postures, efforts to clarify when judges should exercise
lawmaking power or let it remain in other governmental branches?
Some scholars are beginning to explore these issues." But it
would seem that if centrism is to be identified with a particular
jurisprudential approach, the context in which that approach has
emerged needs to be fleshed out. If some Justices on the Court are
minimalists, are there Justices who are maximalists?"1 If some are
437. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 434, at 9.
438. See id. at 9-13.
439. See Lane, supra note 421, at 26 (noting that some criticize O'Connor's "judicial
minimalism" as a self-aggrandizing strategy, shuffling issues to the Supreme Court and,
ultimately, her often-deciding vote).
440. See, e.g., Young, supra note 426, at 1151-54 (arguing that by adopting sweeping
rules rather than narrow resolutions of particular sets of facts, an activist Court handcuffs
future generations of jurists).
441. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 434, at 11 (applying the term
"maximalist" (one who "sharply oppos[es] self-consciously narrow decisions") to Scalia
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incrementalists, are there others who resemble some Warren Court
Justices in their tendency to ground decisions on fullscale
commitments to constitutional values? In short, to what
jurisprudential tendencies are centrist Justices responding? And to
what extent are the axes of the activism-restraint debate relevant to
that inquiry?"2 Has that debate disappeared from the discourse of
commentary on the Court, as Blasi and Schapiro intimated in the
early 1980s? Or does the context in which jurisprudential centrism
has appeared suggest that a version of the debate may have
resurfaced?
This is not the place to explore those questions in detail. But it
would seem that if centrism is to emerge as an important perspective
in the discourse of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, its
multiple meanings would need to be seen as a source of richness
rather than a source of confusion. In the twentieth century history of
commentary on the Court, such perspectives-liberalism and
conservatism being obvious examples-have conveyed quite different
messages as political ideologies and jurisprudential postures without
losing their richness or becoming unintelligible. So it would seem if
the idea of the judicial center is to emerge as an important ingredient
in the mix of twenty-first century constitutional commentary, it would
need to be understood as having significant political and
jurisprudential implications. Moreover, those implications would
need to be seen as sufficiently connected to make centrism appear to
be a comparatively broad and deep approach toward constitutional
interpretation by Supreme Court Justices.
Put specifically, can ideological centrism in the early twenty-first
century-political moderation on a spectrum in which New Deal,
Warren Court-style liberalism is no longer taken seriously and
rightward constitutional revisionism is-become sufficiently yoked to
jurisprudential minimalism or incrementalism for centrism to be seen
as a coherent, potentially expansive alternative to revisionism? That
is Sunstein's ambition in One Case at a Time, but his effort seems
mainly hortatory.
and Thomas).
442. Id. at 4-5 (connecting minimalism to "a range of important and time-honored
ideas in constitutional law" which combine in the proposition that "courts should exercise
the 'passive virtues' associated with maintaining silence on great issues of the day.").
Sunstein cites Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics (1962), as having an "obvious connection" to his effort to sketch judicial




Here two lines of inquiry seem promising. Both begin with the
hypothesis that on the current Court intellectual pressure is coming
from the revisionist Justices on the right, with centrism being a
response to that pressure. The first line posits a connection between
sweeping doctrinal revisionism on the current Court and the
interpretive techniques of fidelity to the text, history, and the original
meaning of constitutional provisions that have been endorsed by
several current Justices on various occasions.443 It then asks whether
that purported connection sheds any light on the appearance of
judicial minimalism and incrementalism. In particular it asks whether
minimalism and incrementalism are being offered as alternative
approaches to constraining the lawmaking power of judges.
In the modern jurisprudential universe, in which judges are
conceded to exercise interpretive lawmaking power and a conflict
between majoritarian democratic theory and lawmaking by unelected
members of the Supreme Court is said to exist, one would expect
theories of the judicial function, especially those endorsed by judges,
to derive their normative appeal from their putative success in
constraining judicial power.'" Unconstrained lawmaking by Justices
with life tenure and little direct political accountability has been the
bete noire of commentators on the Court for decades, and members of
the Court have taken pains to disassociate themselves, rhetorically,
from any intimation that power, rather than legal principles, is their
currency.445
443. Such a connection has been drawn in Erwin Chemerininsky, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE,
supra note 413, at 203-16. Chemerinisky, who believes that "[aill constitutional law is
about value choices," concludes that "[tihe Rehnquist Court's emphasis on original
meaning is itself a value choice." Id. at 212. More pointedly, he suggests that "[tihe
Court's presentation of history as an objective basis for decisions really has subjective
choices masquerading as objective rulings." ld. at 212.
444. For more on the relationship between perceptions that the Supreme Court is a
"countermajoritarian" institution and an obligation on the part of judges to demonstrate
that their constitutional decisions are constrained by history, the constitutional text, or the
institutional and interpretive constraints of process theory, see White, The Arrival of
History, supra note 27, at 523-58, 619-22.
445. The literature related to these propositions is vast. For one sustained effort to
chart the emergence and evolution of scholarship and judicial decisions pivoting around
the "difficulty" raised by the countermajoritarian status of the Supreme Court, see
generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part I: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1
(2000); The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of
Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); The Birth of an
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritan Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE
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In this context, fidelity to the text, history, and the original
meaning of constitutional provisions can be seen as a set of
interpretive principles designed to constrain the exercise of
lawmaking power by judges. If judges attend to the precise meaning
of the Constitution's text, and supplement that meaning by using
history to clarify the sense in which operative words and phrases in
constitutional provisions were generally understood by those who
framed them, they allegedly subject themselves to appropriate
interpretive and institutional constraints. They do not substitute their
potential understandings of a provision, as moderns, for the
understandings of the drafters and ratifiers, and they do not therefore
trespass beyond the institutional boundaries the framers of a
provision meant to erect.46
In its idealized form, originalism would not be a revisionist
theory of constitutional interpretation or of the institutional scope of
judicial power. The "original meaning" of constitutional provisions,
once discerned through appropriate techniques of judicial fidelity,
would hypothetically remain forever in place. 447 But it is abundantly
clear that originalist jurisprudence has generated revisionist doctrinal
postures toward late twentieth and twenty-first century constitutional
issues because successive generations of Justices, since at least the
1930s, openly departed from the original meaning of constitutional
provisions in applying them to new cases. The jurisprudential
concept of a "living Constitution," whose judicially supplied meaning
changes as new political, social, and economic conditions change, has
been endorsed by many judges and commentators over the past
several decades, and is irreconcilable with the interpretive philosophy
of originalism.448  If the standard of constitutional interpretive
correctness is fidelity to the historically grounded original meaning of
constitutional provisions, a great many twentieth century
interpretations of the Constitution by Supreme Court majorities have
been erroneous. If one is a judicial originalist, they need to be
revised.
The substantive implications of originalist-inspired constitutional
L.J. 153 (2000).
446. For a defense of originalism as facilitating judicial restraint and the creation of
broadly applicable rules, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184-85 (1989).
447. With some modifications to take into account changing conventions of
interpretation. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 588-98 (2003).




revisionism are commonly thought to tilt rightward on the
contemporary spectrum of American politics." 9  The previous
discussion of conservatism as a political ideology suggests that such a
conclusion is overly simple. Jurisprudential originalists should only
be interested in "conserving" established judicial interpretations that
are faithful to the historically grounded original meaning of
authoritative legal sources. Originalism on the current Court can be
said to point rightward only because contemporary political
ideologies that endorse a limited conception of governmental
regulatory and redistributive powers and a modest conception of
federal power vis-a-vis that of the states-the mainstream
conceptions of the framing period-are thought to lie on the right of
today's political spectrum. ° It may be appropriate to characterize
originalist revisionists on the current Court as "rightists" in that
sense, but the dominant feature of their jurisprudential stance is its
revisionist doctrinal thrust.
Given the dual jurisprudential implications of contemporary
originalism, centrist minimalism and incrementalism might be seen as
efforts to avoid sweeping doctrinal revisionism without openly
repudiating the idea that fidelity to the text and history of the
Constitution can serve as a constraint on judges as interpreters. A
difficulty with confronting originalism as a purported jurisprudence of
constraint is that other twenty-first century theories designed to
constrain judges as constitutional interpreters-squaring judicial
interpretations with current social practices, attitudes, or conditions,
engaging in process-inspired exercises in judicial restraint, and being
constantly sensitive to the countermajoritarian difficulty-allow
judges more latitude for creative discretion than idealized versions of
originalism, and thus arguably constrain them less. Moreover, the
most direct attack on the theoretical coherence of originalism-that
history is an elusive morass whose "meaning" is constantly being
reinterpreted by subsequent generations and thus cannot serve as a
foundational constraint-arguably brings its proponents back to
449. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 443, at 45 (only one of numerous essays on the
current Court exhibiting that perception).
450. Although historians of the early Republic have advanced quite different causal
explanations for the Framers' modest conceptions of governmental power itself, and of the
reach of the federal government's power over the states, none has gainsaid their modesty,
especially when compared with twentieth century conceptions. For an excellent summary
of how the conceptions of the framers guided John Marshall's decisions, see KENT
NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 479-85
(2001).
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square one; that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is"451
because no real constraints on judicial interpretation exist.
So it may be that centrist minimalism or incrementalism on the
current Court is a way of avoiding doctrinal revisionism without being
forced to confront originalists on their own textual and historical
turf.452 This would seem especially true where centrist incrementalists
continue to follow precedents whose interpretive pedigree can be
shaken by an originalist assault,453 or where they avoid squarely
overruling precedents whose viability now seems undermined.4 4 In
the former instance, the initial constitutional justifications for the
precedents need not be scrutinized; in the latter instance one of the
arguments for originalism-that it avoids constant changes in
constitutional law-is avoided.
All this raises the question whether centrist minimalism and
incrementalism is anything more than a current version of the posture
of avoiding full-blown constitutional decisions once championed by
process theorists. 455  If centrism is now to be thought of as an
451. This phrase, regularly wrested from its context, was uttered in a 1907 speech by
Charles Evans Hughes when he was Governor of New York. The paragraph in which the
phrase appeared read as follows:
I have the highest regard for the courts. My whole life has been spent in work
conditioned upon respect for the courts. I reckon him one of the worst enemies of
the community who will talk lightly of the dignity of the bench. We are under a
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the judiciary is
the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution. I do not
want to see any direct assault upon the courts, nor do I not want to see any indirect
assault upon the courts.
Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 1907),
in ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 1906-1916 at 179, 185-86 (1916).
452. One might contrast the posture with more ambitious efforts by Justices opposed
to doctrinal revisionism to fashion alternative sets of originalist-based interpretations. An
example would be the historically grounded debate between Justices Souter and Thomas
in religion cases. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of. Va., 515 U.S. 819,
852-63, 868-76 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Souter, J., dissenting).
453. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming Roe
v. Wade, but finding that a medical emergency provision did not constitute an undue
burden).
454. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (holding an amendment to the
Colorado constitution precluding government protection based on sexuality violates the
Equal Protection Clause); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy unconstitutional).
455. For all of Sunstein's efforts, his version of minimalism appears to boil down to that
proposition, combined with an argument that incompletely theorized constitutional
decisions reinforce democratic deliberation. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra
note 434, at 261-63. The latter argument was present in process theory literature of the
1950s and 1960s as well, although it did not use the "deliberative democracy" rubric.
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emerging jurisprudential perspective, much more work in ferreting
out its jurisprudential assumptions would seem necessary. An
important concern of that inquiry should be whether a centrist
approach, to serve as a considered alternative to originalism as a
theory of judicial constraint, would need to disengage itself from the
"living Constitution" approach to constitutional interpretation.456
A second line of inquiry is raised by a recent article by Louis
Bilionis .1 7 Bilionis portrays jurisprudential divisions on the current
Court in quite a different way from most other contemporary
commentators. Instead of distinguishing centrist from right-leaning
Justices, he claims that the Court is dominated by a "conservative-
centrist" majority, composed of Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas, whose principal goal is to establish a new model
of judicial scrutiny on the Court.45 The model is designed to
"smudge the boundary between strict scrutiny and the middle,
creating space where more nuanced judgments in the spirit of
measured reasonableness might occur." '459 It "extends judicial review
into the gray area between the poles""46 of rigorous deference and
aggressive activism. Bilionis's essay appears to be the first sustained
effort to see centrism on the Rehnquist Court as part of the long
history of changing standards of judicial scrutiny in American
constitutionalism.
One need not accept Bilionis's description of judicial postures on
the current Court to appreciate his effort to connect what others have
seen as centrist minimalism or incrementalism to theories of judicial
review. The history of American constitutionalism, since at least the
early decades of the twentieth century, can be described in terms of
competing theories of judicial scrutiny. One can start with the so-
called "Lochner era," now the subject of intense scholarly interest,
and trace the shifting dominance of quite different, and in places
456. This assumes that judges and commentators will continue, at least in the short run,
to emphasize the importance of constraints on judges as constitutional interpreters. One
could of course argue that when judges are responsible for fashioning their own
constraints in the form of interpretive approaches, those constraints are illusory. But the
very appeal of originalism suggests that that argument, with its implications for a
constitutional polity in which the Constitution is posited as the ultimate source of law and
Supreme Court Justices are given constitutional interpretive authority, is widely treated as
too discomfiting. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 434, at 209-11
(discussing Justice Scalia's originalism).
457. Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002).
458. Id. at 485.
459. Id. at 515.
460. Id. at 514.
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incompatible, constitutional review postures.4 61
From the uniformly aggressive scrutiny of the first two decades
of the twentieth century, in which no subject matter considerations
affected the Court's review posture, American constitutional
jurisprudence has experienced periods in which commentators, and
subsequently judges, attacked the Court for its lack of deference
toward the policy judgments of legislatures and the Executive
branch;462 experimented with the idea of "preferred" constitutional
rights that triggered heightened scrutiny;463 championed a bifurcated
review posture in which deferential scrutiny was treated as the norm
but heightened scrutiny was reserved for a few areas, first outlined in
the Carolene Products footnote;464 expanded the heightened scrutiny
dimensions of bifurcated review during the later Warren Court
461. For an undocumented overview of that history, see G. Edward White, The
Supreme Court and Constitutional Law, 1925-2000: Changing Stances of Constitutional
Review, 76 VA. Q. REV. 313 (2000).
462. Id. at 315-18.
463. Id. at 318-21.
464. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); White, supra
note 461, at 321-23.
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452 (1938); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931).
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On
restrictions upon the right to vote, see generally Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); on restraints upon the dissemination of
information, see generally Lovell, 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); on interferences with political
organizations, see generally Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg, 282 U.S.
359; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927)
(Brandeis J., concurring); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes
J., dissenting); as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see generally De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religion, Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), or
nationalities, Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), or racial minorities, Condon, 286 U.S. 73;
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Cf. South Carolina State Highway Dep't.
v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2 (1938); McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819), and cases cited.
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years;465 and began to experiment with "intermediate" levels of
scrutiny in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, producing the elaborate
map of scrutiny levels, "tiers" of review, and doctrinal formulas for
invoking them that has given twenty-first century constitutional
exegesis such a blissfully recondite character.466
All of this activity might seem so much gossamer were it not
quite decisive in the Court's constitutional decisionmaking process. It
may be that the most important jurisprudential consequence of the
interplay between centrism and aggressive doctrinal revisionism on
the current Court will be the eventual collapse of the bifurcated
review model of judicial scrutiny. That model may now be in the
stage of ultrarefinement and degeneration that marks the end of
paradigmatic research designs. Smudging the boundary between
"strict scrutiny and the middle" may be the first step in abandoning
tiers of scrutiny altogether. In any event, the "new scrutiny" Bilionis
identifies with centrism may be the first stirrings of something very
important. Commentators might consider paying attention,
particularly because charting the modification of established
approaches to judicial scrutiny furnishes an opportunity to observe
the details of doctrinal revisionism as it takes place.
In short, the idea of the judicial center, elaborated upon and
dissected, seems capable of generating a spate of scholarly projects
for twenty-first century constitutional commentary. The protean
character of the idea itself, which can be a source of frustration for
one trying to come to terms with it, might also be a source of
intellectual stimulation. Late twentieth and early twenty-first century
American constitutional scholarship has sometimes seemed haunted
by a tendency in its practitioners to erect elaborate theoretical
matrices from a few Court decisions whose staying power was
overestimated. But the idea of a judicial center seems far more than a
transient fad.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by intimating that the idea of the judicial
center has had multiple connotations, none of which is entirely
coherent and each of which stand in a potentially awkward
relationship with one another. It concludes that despite these
difficulties, thinking about Justices as being at "the center" of the
current Supreme Court, or as being one or another varieties of
465. White, supra note 461, at 323-28.
466. Id. at 328-30.
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judicial centrists, takes one to the heart of some defining
contemporary issues in twenty-first century constitutional law and
jurisprudence. Because of the multiple meanings of a judicial center
and their shifting use over time, unpacking the idea requires a certain
tolerance for the arcane details of constitutional scholarship. What
emerges at the end of the process, however, is a glimpse of a
potentially new stage in the history of American constitutionalism.
We would profit by cleaning up a lot of loose and misleading talk
about "the center" and "centrism" as applied to Supreme Court
Justices. But the idea of a judicial center actually delivers more than
it might first seem to promise.
